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INTRODUCTION

The proper role of legislative history materials in the interpretation
of ambiguous statutes has been the subject of vigorous debate in both
law reviews and judicial opinions. The traditional view-represented
by judges like Stephen Breyer, John Paul Stevens, and Patricia Wald
and by scholars like William Eskridge and Daniel Farber-is that
judges and administrative agencies should make use of all available
interpretive materials, including congressional committee reports and
floor statements, in trying to understand ambiguous statutes.! Tradit Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus, DePaul University College of Law. I am indebted
to Christopher Carmichael for his outstanding research assistance, and to Dean Teree E. Foster
and the DePaul Faculty Research Fund for their support. William Eskridge, Charles Tiefer,
Stanley Bach, Jeffrey Shaman, Stephen Siegel, and Harold Krent made helpful suggestions on
the manuscript, for which I am grateful. Any mistakes remain my own. I learned how to read
and write statutes during three years as General Counsel to the United States Senate Committee
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tionalists often concede that such use should be tempered by commonsense concerns about reliability, but their position is usually characterized by an overriding respect for and understanding of the legislative
process. Their approach has been dominant in the federal courts for
most of the last one hundred years, and certainly in the period since
World War II. Textualists, on the other hand-represented by judges
like Antonin Scalia and Frank Easterbrook and scholars such as John
Manning and Adrian Vermeule-rely almost exclusively when con-

struing legislation on statutory words, related statutory provisions,

statutory structure, and certain canons of interpretation.2 The extreme

version of this position, rejecting nearly all uses of legislative history,
has won over few federal judges, though it is relentlessly championed

by Justice Scalia.
Textualists have particularly argued against the use of written
committee reports and floor statements by legislators in determining
the meaning of a statute in a particular legal dispute. Several justifica-

tions for declaring this material off-limits to judges have been articulated. It has been argued that the use of materials outside the text assumes that the "intent" rather than the words of a statute is the touchstone in establishing statutory meaning and that the "intent" of the
legislature is both irrelevant and unknowable. 3 It has also been argued

on Armed Services, 1977-1980.
1 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in InterpretingStatutes, 65
S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The
Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3
(1994); Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DUKE LJ. 380; Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court'sNew Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (1995); Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The ChangingStructure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation,108 HARV. L. REV.
593 (1995); Peter L. Strauss, The Courts and the Congress: Should Judges Disdain Political
History? 98 COLUM. L. REV. 242 (1998); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of
Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme
Court,39 AM. U. L. REV. 277 (1990); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretationof Statutes: Toward a Fact-findingModel of Statutory Interpretation,76 VA. L. REv. 1295
(1990).
2 See, e.g.,

ANTONIN SCALTA,

A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997);

JEREMY

WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999); Frank Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains,50 U. CHI.
L. REV. 533 (1983); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through
Statutory Interpretation:An Interest GroupModel, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Kenneth W.
Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L. J. 371; Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74 (2000).
3 Max Radin is often considered the leading intellectual exponent of this view. See
Max
Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930). Textualists frequently argue this
point as if it were self-evident. In fact, contemporary writing by philosophers has recognized the
idea of group "intent' as a valid one, even though it may be difficult to divine the subjective
states of mind of individual members. See, e.g., M.B.W. Sinclair, Statutory Reasoning, 46
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that legislative history materials should be ignored because they are
unreliable, either because they are contrived for political purposes and
do not reflect genuine attempts to clarify meaning, or because they are
drafted by staff members and thus do not represent the views of
elected senators and congressmen at all. 4 Textualists contend, in addition, that legislative history is confusing and contradictory and thus
not helpful to one searching for meaning in an ambiguous phrase.5
Some have occasionally taken the position that legislative history is

DRAKE L. REV. 299 (1997) (examining the validity of the concept of legislative intent and skeptics' arguments against it). Likewise, experts in the legislative process have argued persuasively
that committees and other legislative bodies can be said to have an institutional "intent." See,
e.g., Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000
Wis. L. REv. 205, 259 (claiming "individuals have a collective intention when they act together
with an aim, especially in institutions"); Zeppos, supra note 1, at 1341 (noting that the "textualist's rejection of a collective legislative intent as an incoherent fiction stands in marked contrast
to the numerous areas of the law in which we inquire into the intent of a collective entity as a
matter of fact").
4 Textualists typically offer only anecdotes to support this cynical vision
of the committee
process. As to committee reports, leading scholars of Congress such as Steven S. Smith and
Barbara Sinclair have confirmed to me that there is no published empirical research on how
reports are written. Judges who have first-hand experience with the legislative process, like
Patricia Wald, Abner Mikva, and Stephen Breyer, do not share the textualists' view of the committee process. Likewise, legal scholars who have worked in Congress, like Steven Ross,
Charles Tiefer, and James Brudney, dispute the Public Choice stereotype repeatedly invoked in
Justice Scalia's writings. A particularly useful review of the issues, critical of Justice Scalia's
views, can be found in Daniel Farber & Philip Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74
VA. L. REV. 423,438-46 (1988).
My experience in the late 1970s as General Counsel to the Senate Armed Services Committee was that the process of creating crucial report language was tightly controlled. The really
important bits of language are typically a very small proportion of the whole, since much of the
committee report details the bill's history, explains the committee's process, and complies with
Senate rules on clarifying changes in existing law, etc. Key language directing the Department
of Defense ("DOD") to act in a certain way or explaining the meaning of a statutory change
could come initially from a member of the committee or from a member's staff, from DOD
legislative liaison offices, from defense contractors' lobbyists, or outside groups. Invariably, it
was considered by the committee or subcommittee chair. When I wrote key report language, it
was most often at the specific direction of a member. Often bits of report language were actually
duplicated and circulated to members during markup, and occasionally even voted on (though
usually just accepted by assent). The staff director and general counsel were charged by the
chairman with the job of carefully assembling those approved bits of language for the report.
Minority staff members saw drafts of the report, and if necessary, additional or dissenting views
could be added to the report by members. I remember no occasion in over three years when a
staff member had the temerity to insert his or her own unapproved language into a committee
report, though I have no doubt that it has happened on rare occasions on some committees. As
will be argued more fully in Parts VI and VII, the Rulemaking Clause gives Congress the power
to select its own legislative methods, and this sometimes imperfect process of working with
committee staff has been chosen. Therefore, it must be respected by judges, not demeaned and
caricatured.
5 This argument is undoubtedly true for some legislative history. Traditionalists
surely do
not argue that such materials always clarify the interpretive point raised by the case. If they do
not, the judge must do the best she can with the resources at hand.
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too hard to research properly and should therefore not be consulted.6
Finally, textualists frequently take the position that refusal to go outside the four walls of statutory text and structure (except perhaps to
use dictionaries or canons of construction) encourages lawmakers to
be sloppy in writing statutes. On this theory, those who write statutes
would react to a uniformly textualist mode of interpretation in the
more carefully and articulating their
courts by considering statutes
7
precisely.
more
meaning
6 Inaccessibility is certainly the weakest argument for not consulting legislative
history

materials. By far the most important legislative history components are published committee
reports and floor statements. Despite its editorial problems, the Congressional Record has been
easily available for decades. Published committee reports have likewise been easy to find, and
are now even more accessible. Hearings are sometimes published late, but are available at federal depository libraries. Markup records were harder to find in the past but are now available on
various on-line services. At least since the advent of the Congressional Information Service
("CIS") in about 1970, all of the primary legislative sources have been easy and inexpensive to
find. Today the excellent Thomas database of the Library of Congress, CIS, the authoritative
reference publications of Congressional Quarterly and subscription services such as Legi-Slate
contain all the legislative history a lawyer or judge could want, including un-passed bills and
markup records. The excellent index materials on CIS for passed bills gives the researcher a
clear history of each piece of legislation, as a starting point for research.
The deeper problem, of course, is that many lawyers and judges do not feel comfortable
with legislative history materials, and probably were not introduced to legislative research methods in law school.
Other kinds of cases can be dauntingly complex for the lawyer and judge. There can be no
doubt that objectively it is much more difficult to work through the rulemaking record in a complex Clean Air Act case from the EPA, with voluminous comments and scientific studies, than to
find the appropriate legislative history materials to illuminate a difficult statutory interpretation
problem.
7 Arguing that strict construction of statutes will force legislative drafters to behave differently raises a host of unexplored empirical questions, as Professor Garrett and others have
pointed out. Textualists typically offer no evidence for their assertion. In my experience, there
are several obvious problems with this argument. First, members and their staffs do not have a
sophisticated knowledge of the courts' interpretive habits, and frankly don't pay much attention
to them. Second, even assuming the ablest draftsmen and members' best efforts to be comprehensive, legislation simply cannot anticipate and solve all of the possible problems that may arise
later in application. Third, and more important, the argument assumes that "problems" in statutory text-ambiguities, inconsistencies, and the like-are the result of inadvertence or incompetence. In fact, they usually represent compromises necessary to assemble the votes needed for
passage or to avoid contentious issues that would doom the bill in question. Certainly it would
be helpful if legislators always wrote absolutely clear statutes. But those who chide Congress for
its failures do not understand that each additional clarifying amendment means another debate on
the floor, another opportunity for delay or another vote lost, making it more difficult to enact the
bill. It is emphatically not for the courts to say whether such items should have been given
priority in constructing the legislation and guiding it through the House and Senate, while keeping the White House happy as well. Because Congress has the constitutional power both to
control its enactment process and to make policy decisions, the courts must do the best they can
with the result, and not attempt to "correce members' sloppy drafting practices.
Perhaps the textualists would also support legislation to "correct" the way the Supreme
Court writes its opinions. We would be better off if the Court always addressed the merits of
important questions, without taking refuge in justiciability arguments. We would benefit from
more care in using the same language to describe the same legal doctrine each time it is invoked.
The Court's decisions would be better if they always articulated a clear basis of decision and
were consistent with one another. But of course, the Congress has no such power to affect the
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All of these justifications have an air of pragmatism about them.
Whatever the underlying aims of the textualists, their standard critique
of the use of legislative history suggests that it is not helpful, that it
can be misleading, and that it is not as reliable an indicator of what the
legislature wanted as the text itself. In recent years, however, a new
kind of attack on the use of legislative history has emerged. Popularized by Justice Scalia, this line of argument is that the use of legislative history materials to determine the meaning of an ambiguous statute is actually inconsistent with Article I of the Constitution. As described in more detail below, 8 this position seems to have two components. First, substitution of a committee report or a floor statement for
the statutory text in order to settle a disputed question of meaning
would in effect constitute a delegation by the Congress to an individual or to a committee, and is inconsistent with the non-delegation doctrine. Second, since a judge would arguably be giving legal effect to
committee statements or floor statements in the same way one does to
enacted text, such use would run afoul of the Supreme Court's structural separation of powers cases, which established that Congress can
only act by bicameral passage and presentment to the President.
These new arguments, like the standard textualist ones, are deeply
rooted in a suspicion of legislators and their motives that is derived
from Public Choice theory.9
What seems different about these new justifications for ignoring
legislative history materials is that they strike at the very legitimacy of
the committee reports and other interpretive evidence gleaned from
the enactment process. This position, which I shall characterize for
the purposes of this Article as "radical textualism," does not depend
on whether using legislative history produces an answer to the interpretive problem before the court, or whether it accurately reveals the
intentions of those who wrote the statute. Indeed, Justice Scalia and
Professor Manning apparently do not care whether reference to a
committee report indisputably clarifies an ambiguous statutory phrase.
Even if it did, its use would be prohibited by concerns over nondelegation of legislative power and by more general separation of

process, and it must take Supreme Court decisions as it finds them.
8 See infra Part
1I.
9 Public Choice and Social Choice theories impose an economic
model on the legislative
process, in which legislators act solely to makimize their chances of re-election and special
interest groups seek legislation benefiting their interests. Social Choice advocates argue, building upon Arrow's Theorem, that the legislative product rarely represents the wishes of a majority
of legislators, and that there can be no such thing as legislative intent. For an analysis of how
these gloomy views of legislative behavior have affected textualism, see Schacter, supra note 1;
Zeppos, supra note 1.
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powers principles.'0 The radical textualists are not content with arguing that their approach yields "better" interpretive results, but rather
contend that the traditional use of legislative history is out of bounds
constitutionally and thus not permitted regardless of its efficacy.
Their newer formalist argument, then, is aimed at the very heart of the
legislative enactment process--contending that use of committee materials, floor statements, and similar references lack constitutional legitimacy. It is obviously a more powerful argument against the use of
legislative history than earlier realist ones, because it is invulnerable to
such practical responses as distinguishing between authoritative and
non-authoritative floor statements, or adopting measures to improve
the reliability and authority of committee reports. It is a final extension of Public Choice theories about legislative behavior, culminating
in a rejection of the legislative process itself."
It is therefore not too much of an exaggeration to assert, as I have
done in the title of the Article, that the question before us is whether
congressional committees are constitutional. Admittedly, Justice
Scalia would not contend that committees themselves are unconstitutional, but his rhetorical assaults on the committee process and especially committee reports, as we shall see in Part II, bring him perilously close to that position. At the very least he argues that one of the
committee's most important functions--creating authoritative explanations of legislation it sends to the floor-is unconstitutional. Statutory text, say the radical textualists, has legitimacy because it rests
solidly on Article I bicameral enactment and presentment to the President. Language in committee reports has not been voted on by both
houses or presented to the President and is therefore without constitutional legitimacy.
This Article attempts to demonstrate that the radical textualist
view of the enactment process, and its relationship to Article I, is profoundly wrong. My aim is not to elevate legislative history materials
to a higher position of authoritativeness and deference, but rather to
establish the constitutional legitimacy of the current widespread practice of using such resources as good contextual evidence of what an
ambiguous statutory provision means. I will first argue (in Parts II
10 Justice Stevens made this point during his dialogue with Justice Scalia in Conroy v.
Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511,518 n.12 (1993).
While the approaches of traditionalists and textualists on matters of statutory interpretation are often predictable, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Food and Drug Administration
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), denying the Food and Drug Administration the power to regulate cigarettes, is puzzling, to say the least. Advocates of regulation, led by Justice Stevens, relied heavily on the plain language of the statute, and opponents,
including Justice Scalia, used legislative history materials extensively. Justice Scalia omitted his
usual scolding about the use of such materials.
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through V) that the latest formalist attack of the radical textualists is
deeply flawed, and that both the non-delegation doctrine and the Supreme Court's structural Article I cases have no relevance to the constitutional position of the congressional committee. I will then demonstrate (in Parts VI and VII) that the committee process, indeed the
entire enactment process, rests on its own independent Article I footing- the Rulemaking Clause of Section 5. Contrary to the arguments
of the radical textualists, pre-enactment legislative history materials
are created pursuant to Congress's constitutional power to determine
the rules of its own proceedings. While not as binding as statutes,
committee reports are entitled to respect and should be used as authoritative aids in interpretation because they are an integral part of the
process by which Congress creates and explains the substance of statutes. We will also examine in Part VII the extensive use of committee
reports by the executive branch, lending further support to the argument for their authoritative use by courts.
The Article is therefore guided by the principle that one's theory
of statutory interpretation should be rooted in a coherent and defensible general theory of government, and should be consistent with what
Professor Mashaw has called "the constitutional order.' 12 1 would add,
as many judges, former legislators, and former legislative staff members have argued, that above all a theory of statutory interpretation
should be firmly anchored in a coherent and nuanced understanding of
the legislative process. 13 Only then can the proper place of committees and committee reports as necessary contextual aids in giving
meaning to ambiguous statutory text be properly understood.
I. THE RADICAL TEXTUALIST POSITION
Before proceeding further, it is perhaps wise to look more carefully at the radical textualist position, ensuring that the arguments presented here accurately represent it as they attempt a coherent response.
The notion that an arm of Congress, like a committee or even one
house, cannot exercise the lawmaking power of Article I was articulated in INS v. Chadha, 14 as we shall see in Part V. Justice Stevens
Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation
of Federal
Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 827, 839 (1991).
13 Perhaps the best exposition of this "Positive Political Theory"
approach, and one of the
best analyses of how legislative history is created, is McNollgast, supra note 1. More recently,
Charles Tiefer, one the country's ablest experts on legislative procedure, has exhaustively examined the process of creating legislative history. See Tiefer, supra note 3. Another excellent view
from within the legislative process is James J. Brudney, CongressionalCommentary on Judicial
Interpretationsof Statutes: Idle Chatteror Telling Response? 93 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1994).
12

14

462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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later stated the point clearly in his Bowsher v. Synar concurrence

(though the majority took a different tack):
Congress may not exercise its fundamental power to formulate
national policy by delegating that power to one of its two
Houses, to a legislative committee, or to an individual agent of
the Congress such as the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Sergeant at Arms of the5 Senate, or the Director of
the Congressional Budget Office.
Adapting this fundamental principle to the constitutional legitimacy of legislative history, however, took place over some years, beginning in the mid-1980s. Criticism of the overuse of legislative history, based on both realist and functionalist concerns, became more
common during this period. Articles by Judges Easterbrook and Starr
began to articulate the Article I analysis, but without explicit use of
the non-delegation doctrine. While sitting as a court of appeals judge,

Justice Scalia developed his own arguments against reference to legislative history. After his arrival on the Supreme Court in 1988, the
attacks on legislative history intensified, and increasingly included
formalist arguments based on Chadha and Article J.16 In 1990, Professor Eskridge comprehensively traced these various intellectual
strands of what he called "the new textualism," and noted the emerging importance of arguments based on Chadha and Article I of the
Constitution. 17 At that point, explicit use of the non-delegation doc15 478 U.S. 714, 737 (1986). Justice Stevens emphasized this aspect of the non-delegation

principle in Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, in an opinion joined by Justice Scalia,
noting that "Congress may not delegate the power to legislate to its own agents or to its own
members." Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252,275 (1991).
16 See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring
in
the judgment). In Wisconsin Public Intervenorv. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991), during one of
his now-routine rhetorical assaults on the use of legislative history, he says:
All we know for sure is that the full Senate adopted the text that we have before us
here, as did the full House, pursuant to the procedures prescribed by the Constitution;
and that text, having been transmitted to the President and approved by him, again pursuant to the procedures prescribed by the Constitution, became law ....[W]e should try
meaning, whatever various committees might have had to sayto give the text its fair
thereby affirming the proposition that we are a Government of laws, not of committee
reports.
Id. at 621.
See also Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 520 n.2 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("It is to be
assumed-by a sort of suspension of disbelief-that two-thirds of the Members of both Houses
of Congress (or a majority plus the President) were aware of these statements and must have
agreed with them; or perhaps it is to be assumed-by a sort of suspension of the Constitutionthat Congress delegated to that personage or personages the authority to say what its laws
mean.').
17 William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 52.489

trine as a separate analytical tool was not yet in vogue among the textualists.
Later in the 1990s, Justice Scalia strengthened and clarified his
developing Article I critique of references to legislative history, as he
continued his practice of objecting to each and every instance of it in
opinions by other justices. A particularly good example is the 1996
case of Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co. 18 In
their concurring opinions, he and Justice Stevens debated the use of
legislative history. In response to Justice Stevens' view (with which
this Article agrees) that we should use legislative history because
Congress intends for it to express the views of the body during the
enactment process, Justice Scalia wrote:
But assuming Justice Stevens is right about this desire to leave
details to the committees, the very first provision of the Constitution forbids it. Article I, §1 provides that "all legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives."... No one would think that the House of
Representatives could operate in such fashion that only the
broad outlines of bills would be adopted by vote of the full
House, leaving minor details to be written, adopted, and voted
upon only by the cognizant committees. 19
In his 1997 book, A Matter of Interpretation, Justice Scalia
enlarges somewhat on his basic idea. After arguing that committee
reports can't actually represent the intent of the entire legislative body,
he wrote:
Another response simply challenges head-on the proposition that no legislative history must reflect Congressional
thinking: 'Committee reports are not authoritative because the
full house presumably knows and agrees with them, but rather
because the full house wants them to be authoritative-that is,
leaves to its committees the details of its legislation.' It may
or may not be true that the houses entertain such a desire....
But if it is true, it is unconstitutional. . . . The legislative
power is the power to make laws, not the power to make legislators. It is nondelegable. Congress can no more authorize
516 U.S. 264 (1996).
Id. at 280 (Scalia, J., concurring). As explained more fully in Part VI, this Article argues
that Congress could come very close to doing under the authority of the Rulemaking Clause
exactly what Justice Scalia finds so inconceivable.
18
19
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one committee to 'fill in the details' of a particular law in a
binding fashion than it can authorize a committee to enact minor laws.2°
It fell to Professor John Manning, who clerked for Justice Scalia
during the 1988-89 Term of the Supreme Court, to give this new theory a full scholarly exegesis. 2 ' In his 1997 article, Manning reiterates
the usual textualist attacks against the use of legislative history, but
then adds two interesting new arguments.
First, Manning recognizes that the general non-delegation doctrine
cannot easily be applied to the use of legislative history materials. 22
He notes, as discussed in Part IV below, that broad delegations to executive agencies and courts have routinely been upheld against a nondelegation attack. He also recognizes that the use of other extrinsic
materials in interpretation is widely accepted by all sides in the interpretive debate. Some way must be found, then, for the committed
textualist to distinguish the use of legislative history by courts from
more traditional delegations of legislative power and from the use of
materials like dictionaries and canons. Manning finds that distinction
in the new concept of "self-delegation." Use of legislative history to
substitute for enacted text in determining the meaning of a statute is
actually more dangerous and more constitutionally suspect, in his
view, than traditional delegation of legislative power.
By using legislative history to interpret ambiguous statutory texts,
argues Professor Manning, courts encourage the Congress to use broad
language and to evade its responsibility to be precise in statutory drafting.23 The problem is more serious than with delegation to executive
20 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATER OF INTERPRETATION 35 (1997) (citations omitted).
21

John F. Manning, Textualism As a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673

(1997).

lId at 690-97, 725-27. "The nondelegation rationale, however, leads to a potential paradox requiring explanation." Id. at 695.
22

This Article does not purport to give a detailed refutation of Professor Manning's arguments. I must add a word on this important point, however. Manning argues that Congress
enacts vague statutes because courts allow it to, through their consideration of explanations
found in committee reports. He also argues that Congress uses this process to evade its responsibility to enact detailed text. He offers no empirical support for either proposition, and I am
aware of none. As noted in Parts VI and VII infra, there are many reasons why members might
choose one level of detail over another in enacting legislation. There is no "correct" level of
detail. Manning even goes so far as to say that any idea which can be expressed in legislative
history could have been written into the statute in the first place. Manning, supra note 21, at
728-30. This astounding assertion is also offered without support. Legislative drafters know that
it is often difficult to encompass all future possibilities within the formal strictures of statutory
text, and that much legislative history is intended to record background principles, not details
that could just as easily be in the text. Finally, Manning writes as if all legislative history were
written for an audience of judges, when in fact the principal audience is most often the relevant
executive branch agency.
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agencies of the power to make future policy decisions, because there
Congress has a strong incentive to specify its meaning as clearly as
possible, lest it lose control over the formulation of the policy. Selfdelegation, including the making of legislative history intended to
influence later interpretation, allows Congress to have its cake and eat
it too. It can make vague legislative decisions, and it can keep control
of the interpretive process through the use of legislative history. It can
evade its important responsibility to openly make tough policy
choices. Thus, in Manning's view, delegation to the executive branch
agencies or the courts is constitutionally permissible, while delegation
to committees or to individual members through legislative history (a
form of self-delegation) is not.
Professor Manning's second contribution to the refinement of the
radical textualists' Article I arguments involves a re-interpretation of
the Supreme Court's Article I cases, chiefly INS v. Chadha24 and Bowsher v. Synar.25 He reads those cases as an acceptance by the Court of
his concept of self-delegation. Chadha must stand for something
more profound than a violation of Article I procedural requirements
for law making, Manning argues. 26 He concludes that it supports a
more general proposition, that Congress cannot under our constitutional structure participate directly in the process of law application
(law elaboration, he calls it), but is confined strictly to enacting legislation in conformance with Article I procedures. Therefore, legislative
history, since it attempts to control the way in which a statute is applied by the courts, runs afoul of the self-delegation principle. 27
Professor Manning sees Bowsher as an even stronger rejection by
the Court of Congress's attempt to participate in execution of the laws.
The overriding idea is that law elaboration is an executive or a judicial
function, not a congressional one, and authoritative use of legislative
history involves the Congress, through self-delegation, trying to interpret the laws as well as to enact them.
In short, Professor Manning attempts, through the concept of selfdelegation, to reorient the textualists' Article I argument, arguing that
legislative history is an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to par462 U.S. 919 (1983).
478 U.S. 714 (1986).
26 Manning, supra note 21, at 716-18. "The Chadha Court's
deceptively simple reasoning
cannot be taken at face value.... Indeed, Chadha delivers a subtler more precise constitutional
message: Congress will find it too attractive to sidestep bicameralism and presentment if it can
delegate power and retain power over the delegatee." Id. at 719.
27 Id. at 718-19 ("Legislative history gives rise to
a similar concern.... Using legislative
history to that end allows Congress to shift law elaboration from the full legislative process to the
less cumbersome process of generating legislative history.").
24
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ticipate in the process of law elaboration. 28 Though his arguments are
sometimes a confusing amalgam of Article I separation of powers
arguments and non-delegation theory, his overall thrust is clear, and it
substantially deepens the earlier textualist analysis.
II. PRELIMINARY ISSUES
Before turning to a detailed analysis of the radical textualists' arguments, I should deal with some preliminary issues in order to clarify
my arguments and render the discussion more manageable.
First, I must set out some limitations to my exploration of the constitutional legitimacy of legislative history materials. For clarity and
in deference to the reader's patience, I will confine my argument to
the most important type of legislative history-the written reports of
legislative committees and conference committees. This is not because I do not believe a good case can be made for the constitutional

legitimacy of drafting history, or of certain floor statements by bill
managers or committee chairs in the enactment process. Rather, it is
because floor statements, hearing transcripts, drafting history and the
like, raise other reliability questions, and are not used even by many
judges who support the authoritative use of committee reports. As we
shall see in Part VII, the written products of committee deliberation in
the House and Senate occupy a unique position in the enactment process. In addition, empirical studies of the use of legislative history by
courts show that they are by far the most heavily used among the various interpretive items available to judges.2 9 They will therefore pro28 It is not entirely clear whether Manning is arguing unconstitutionality
in the strong or the
weak sense. Indeed, his use of phrases like "in tension with" suggests that he is not sure how far
his arguments can go in declaring legislative history materials "unconstitutional." id. at 716-27.
It is not even clear from his writings whether he is arguing ultimately that Congress should not
be permitted to create legislative history materials, or that courts should be prohibited from using
them. Either alternative presents serious analytical problems. If he argues that Congress
shouldn't be permitted to make legislative history, he must contend with the obvious fact that it
has many other legitimate uses aside from controlling future court interpretations of statutory
text. If he argues that courts shouldn't be permitted to use it, difficult problems of enforcement
are raised. Despite all of his sophisticated constitutional arguments, Manning ends his article by
arguing that some legislative history is acceptable, so long as it is not "concocted" to influence
courts. See id. at 731-38. He does not explain how we (or federal judges, for that matter) are to
tell the difference between good and bad committee language, and his acceptance of some legislative history severely undermines his fundamental idea that legislative history can be thought of
as unconstitutional self-delegation.
29 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine,
72
WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1994) (noting Judge Wald's data, cited below); Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalismin Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation:Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1, 36 (1998) (noting a
resurgence in the use of legislative history from an analysis of the cases of the Supreme Court's
1996 term); Tiefer, supra note 3, at 225 (surveying 17 cases from 1995-99 where the Court made
significant use of legislative history); WVald, supra note 1, at 277 (noting that one-third of the
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vide the vehicle for my exploration of the Article I legitimacy of
committee materials.
Second, in exploring the constitutional position of the committee
report, I will confine my defense to pre-enactment materials. My theory of constitutional legitimacy applies to written committee reports
that are produced in the process of enacting a statute, explaining the
committee's action on the bill text. Committee reports occasionally
try to re-interpret the language of previously enacted statutes outside
the context of reporting amendments to the statute (e.g., through the
vehicle of an unrelated appropriation or budget reconciliation bill), or
to direct the application of the previously enacted statute without further legislative action. 30 Both of these types of committee activity,
though, are properly vulnerable to the very Article I objections raised
by the radical textualists to all committee action. They represent instances where Congress is indeed trying to change the law without
bicameral enactment or presentment to the President. In the arguments that follow, I will confine my discussion to language in written
committee reports that accompany and explain a reported bill and
were written prior to its passage.
Finally, I should clarify exactly what I mean by use of committee
reports in the interpretive process. If I am correct that the Constitution, properly understood, supports the use of written pre-enactment
committee language in statutory interpretation, but also that such language does not rise to the level of enacted law, in what sense is it
binding or authoritative? Traditionalist judges would find that point
excessively academic, to be sure. Legislative history is what it is, and
its value derives from its clarity and its persuasiveness under all the
circumstances. It is part of a system of practical reasoning, in the
words of Professors Eskridge and Frickey. Since I am attempting to
establish the affirmative constitutional legitimacy of this widely accepted practice, however, it seems only fair to specify as clearly as
practicable the level of authoritativeness I am arguing for. When I use
the term "authoritative reference" in this Article, therefore, I am advocating a degree of deference to the clearly expressed views of a preenactment legislative committee document that is more than casual.
Use of such material by judges and agencies as a contextual aid in

Supreme Court's 1988-89 term cases made substantial use of legislative history); Nicholas Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation:An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV.
1073, 1092-93 (1992) (noting that in a random sample of 413 Supreme Court majority decisions
the Court used legislative sources in 87.7%).
30 See infra Part
VIL
31 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 1, at
321.
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resolving statutory ambiguity is not wholly discretionary. My theory
requires judges to defer to clearly expressed legislative history not as a
matter of law but of comity, in recognition of Congress' separate
power to determine its own rules of proceedings in Article I, Section
5. It is similar to the deference accorded to the views of administrative agencies in interpreting federal statutes before Chevron U.S.A. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.32 It places pre-enactment
legislative statements in written committee reports in a position of
primacy among the available interpretive materials, second only to the
text of the enacted statute itself. As noted above, this level of respect
is not new, but represents the current practice of most federal judges,
recognizing that many contested statutory problems benefit from contextual analysis in order to resolve otherwise inexplicable inconsistencies or ambiguities.
IR. THE NON-DELEGATION DoCTRINE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

A. Introduction
What then are we to make of the radical textualist attack on legislative history based on the non-delegation doctrine? As we have seen,
the thrust of this argument is that Congress, when it creates legislative
history, engages in a sort of self-delegation of legislative power to
committees (or to individuals during floor debate). Giving power to a
committee or an individual to fix the meaning of an ambiguous statutory term is like delegating excessive power to administrative agencies
or the President to decide what the law shall be.
The non-delegation doctrine would seem a curious choice of tools
to employ against the practice of using legislative history. As any law
student who has taken administrative law can attest, the history of the
non-delegation doctrine proves conclusively that it has in actual practice restrained very little delegation of legislative power.33 Even when
32

467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Supreme Court has referred to this weaker form of deference

to agency interpretations as "Skidmore deference" after the celebrated case of Skidmore v. Swift
& Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). Its most recent analysis of deference appears in United States v.
Mead Corp., 121 S. Ct. 2164, 2175 (2001) (holding that tariff classification rulings of the U.S.
Customs Service are not entitled to Chevron deference). For a good overall analysis of the
differences between the two forms of deference, see Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. H-ickman,
Chevron's Domain, 89 GEo. LJ. 833 (2001).
33 The scholarly literature on the non-delegation doctrine, and its identical
twin the delegation doctrine, is voluminous. See, e.g., 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.6 (3d ed. 1994); Carl McGowan, Congress, Court and
Control of Delegated Power, 77 CoLUM. L. REV. 1119 (1977); Richard B. Stewart, Beyond
DelegationDoctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323 (1987); Symposium, The Phoenix Rises Again: The
Nondelegation Doctrinefrom Constitutionaland Policy Perspectives,20 CARDOzO L. REV. 731
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taken seriously, as we shall briefly see below, it requires only a specification by the legislature of an intelligible principle to guide the discretion delegated; a complete prohibition against any delegation of
discretion by the legislature is not even advocated by conservative
judges like Justice Scalia, and in any event is completely impractical
in the complex legal world of the twenty-first century. One is tempted
to dismiss this argument by simply observing, as demonstrated in Part
VII of this Article, that Congress gives ample guidance to its committees when it refers legislation to them, and therefore meets the "intelligible principle" requirement of case law.
A more fundamental response to the attack of the radical textualists based on the non-delegation doctrine, however, is that the doctrine
has always been understood to refer to delegations by the legislature
of power to make policy in the future. What Justice Scalia, Professor
Manning, and their allies are really describing is not self-delegation at
all. I would readily agree that delegation to a congressional committee
to make legally binding policy choices without guidance at some future time would implicate the non-delegation doctrine. What they
argue against is actually something never discussed in the vast literature on the non-delegation doctrine-not self-delegation but backward
delegation by the legislature. Confusion over the difference between
events taking place after enactment and those taking place before enactment leads the radical textualists into a logically and historically
indefensible position. Also, from the broader standpoint of theory,
since Congress takes formal Article I action after the creation of the
legislative history that so disturbs the radical textualists, that fact
would seem to correct any perceived problem of accountability or
democratic control, concerns that lie at the heart of the traditional
delegation doctrine.
B. Originand Purposes of the Non-DelegationDoctrine
The notion that the legislature is the only branch of our national
government permitted to make binding policy for the society is an old
one. Though it is now thought of as a doctrine that reinforces broader
separation of powers concepts, it actually pre-dates separation of powers and has different roots. Professors Peter Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn,
and Glen Robinson, in their influential article on the doctrine, point
out that "It]he delegation of legislative power is an old concern, older
than the Constitution or even than the separation-of-powers princi-

(1999).
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ple.' 34 They quote John Locke to illustrate that delegation actually
springs from the idea that legislatures are direct agents of the people,
and thus are not empowered to give away their policy-making authority to any other body in government:
The Legislative cannot transfer the Power of Making
Laws to any other hands. For it being but a delegated Power
from the People, they, who have it, cannot pass it over to
others.... And when the people have said, We will submit
to rules, and be govern'd by Laws made by such Men, and in
such Forms, no Body else can say other Men shall make
Laws for them; nor can the people be bound by any Laws but
such as are Enacted by those, whom they have Chosen, and
Authorised to make Laws for them. The power of the Legislative being derived from the People by a positive voluntary
Grant and Institution, can be no other, than what the positive
Grant conveyed, which being only to make Laws, and not to
make Legislators, the Legislative can have no power to
transfer their Authority of making laws, and place it in other
hands.35
C. Supreme Court Treatment of the Non-DelegationDoctrine
The history of the non-delegation doctrine in the Supreme Court is
too well known to require detailed exposition here. The Court has
struggled since the days of the Framers to reconcile the agency idea
expressed above-that Congress cannot give away policy-making
power received directly from the citizenry-with the obvious fact that
all administration, all "execution of the laws," requires some discretion. The Court developed a number of different doctrines or linguistic formulations to avoid the inevitable conclusion that Congress delegates a certain amount of discretion every time it makes a law, and
cannot possibly include in the text all of the details necessary to control every application of each of its laws. In the early case of the The
Brig Aurora v. United States36 in 1813, for example, the Court upheld
a statute giving power to the President to lift a statutory embargo under certain conditions on the theory that the President did not exercise
legislative discretion in deciding to lift the embargo, but only found
34

(1982).
35

Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 4
Id. at 4 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATiSES OF GOVERNMENT 380-81 (Cambridge

Univ. Press 1960) (1690)).
36 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:489

certain prerequisite facts described in advance by Congress.37 In
Wayman v. Southard,38 in 1825, the Court was able to uphold the
power to make rules delegated to the federal courts by finding that the
legislature itself had made the important policy choices, leaving the
judicial branch only the power to "fill up the details" of the statutory
scheme. 39 In the celebrated case of Field v. Clark40 in 1892, the justices were able to reconcile broad power given to the President to impose tariffs in the future by saying that his principal role was to find
facts triggering the imposition that was really authorized in advance
by Congress. 4 1 And in J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States42 in
1928, the Court first articulated the important notion that delegations
of policy-making power to the President do not offend the nondelegation doctrine so long as Congress provides an "intelligible43principle" to guide the President's use of the discretion given to him.
To be sure, in two celebrated New Deal cases the Supreme Court
used the non-delegation doctrine to strike down portions of the National Industrial Recovery Act. 44 But those cases are exceptions that
prove the rule. Whatever their doctrinal validity at the time, they are
the only instances in the Court's history in which the non-delegation
See id. at 387 ("The legislature did not transfer any power of legislation to the President.
They only prescribed the evidence which should be admitted of a fact, upon which the law should
go into effect.").
38 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.)
1 (1825).
39 Id. at 42-43, 45 ("It will not be contended that Congress
can delegate to the Courts, or to
any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative. But Congress may
certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightly exercise itself... The
power given to the Court to vary the mode of proceeding in this particular, is a power to vary
minor regulations, which are within the great outlines marked out by the legislature in directing
the execution.").
40 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
37

41

Id. at 693 ("Legislative power was exercised when Congress declared that the suspension should take effect upon a named contingency. What the President was required to do was
simply in execution of the act of Congress. It was not the making of law. He was the mere agent
of the law-making department to ascertain and declare the event upon which its expressed will
was to
take effect.").
42 276
U.S. 394 (1928).
43 Id. at 409 ("Congress may use executive officers in the application
and enforcement of a
policy declared in law by Congress, and authorize such officers in the application of the Congressional declaration to enforce it by regulation equivalent to law.... If Congress shall lay
down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix
such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.").
44 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
(holding that
part of the Act authorizing the President to approve codes of fair competition was invalid because it attempted an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power); Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (holding that executive orders and regulations issued prohibiting the
transportation of petroleum invalid because they transcended constitutional limits on delegation
of power).
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doctrine was used to invalidate a federal statute. Since that time the

Supreme Court has been much more deferential, repeatedly upholding
broad delegations of policy-making discretion to the President or to
administrative agencies under vague and sweeping congressional language.45 The non-delegation doctrine has been employed more subtly
on occasion as an excuse to narrow delegations of authority, avoiding

possible constitutional issues, 46 but it has not been a significant impediment to the rise of the administrative state.
D. Recent DoctrinalDevelopments

Chief Justice Rehnquist stands almost alone among Supreme
Court Justices in advocating a re-invigoration of the non-delegation
doctrine. In doing so, he has articulated with clarity the underlying
functions that a meaningful doctrine could serve. Three such functions were discussed in his well-known concurring opinion in Industrial Union Departmentv. American Petroleum Institute47 (the "Benzene" case) in 1980, which argued that the OSHA statute's guidance to
the agency in exercising its power to control toxic substances in the
workplace was too vague to pass constitutional muster. First, a working non-delegation doctrine would ensure "that important choices of
social policy are made by Congress, the branch of our Government

most responsive to the popular will.''48 Second, it would provide,
through the requirement of a meaningful "intelligible principle" in the
statute, guidance for bureaucrats in carrying out the purposes of a stat-

More recent examples of broad delegations upheld range from Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414 (1944) (standards for setting price controls) to Mistrettav. United States, 488 U.S.
361 (1989) (authority to create sentencing guidelines). Though not often thought of in this context, the Court's seminal decision in Chevron U.S.A.. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), may rank as the most liberal of all delegation cases, in that it requires
federal judges to defer to the decisions of administrative agencies construing ambiguous statutory provisions. In the recent line-item veto case, Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417
(1998), Justices Scalia, O'Connor, and Breyer would have upheld the statute under review because it was not really a veto, but rather a delegation to the President to decline to spend certain
items, and was accompanied by appropriate standards. The majority rejected the non-delegation
approach, opting instead to see the case as involving Article I bicameralism and presentment
issues. See Steven F. Huefher, The Supreme Court'sAvoidance of the Nondelegation Doctrine
in Clinton v. City of New York. More Than "A Dime's Worth of Difference," 49 CATH. U. L.
REV. 337 (2000).
46 See, e.g., National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States,
415 U.S. 336 (1974) (distinguishing between "taxes," which only Congress has the authority to levy, and "fees," which the
FCC could levy provided the correct standard is used); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958)
(reading Secretary of State's power to refuse to issue a passport narrowly to avoid constitutional
problems).
4, 448 U.S. 607,671-88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
48 Id. at
685.
45
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ute, minimizing arbitrariness. 49 Third, it would create a standard by
which courts can determine whether an agency has over-stepped its
policy-making boundaries. 50 Most importantly for our purposes, even
Justice Rehnquist did not argue that no delegation of legislative power
should be permitted under the non-delegation doctrine, but only that
the "intelligible principle" requirement be taken seriously.
The wide-ranging modern debate among scholars over the wisdom
of the non-delegation doctrine centers on its relationship to the administrative process, addressing the need to curb executive and agency
discretion exercised pursuant to the statutes delegating administrative
policy-making power. For some, like Professor Davis, the focus is on
the control of arbitrariness by administrators, though Davis' solution is
to abandon the non-delegation doctrine as unworkable and concentrate
on the requirement that agencies themselves articulate clear safeguards
to guide their exercise of discretion. 51 For other critics, like David
Schoenbrod, the issue is reversing the tendency of Congress to shirk
its policy-making function and to bestow too much discretion on unresponsive and unelected bureaucrats.52
The Supreme Court's most recent excursion into non-delegation
jurisprudence was written by Justice Scalia for a unanimous Court in
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc. 53 Justice Scalia, in
rejecting the misguided attempt by Judge Williams in the D.C. Circuit
to create a new delegation doctrine focusing on the duty of agencies
themselves to clarify vague grants of legislative power, summarized
the "intelligible principle" cases in a most traditional way, strengthening the view that there is no imaginable statutory delegation language
that would be found unconstitutional on these grounds today.54

Id. at 685-86

("Second, the doctrine guarantees that, to the extent Congress finds it
necessary to delegate authority, it provides the recipient of that authority with an 'intelligible
principle' to guide the exercise of the delegated discretion.").
Id. at 686 ("Third, and derivative of the second, the doctrine ensures that
courts charged
with reviewing the exercise of delegated legislative discretion will be able to test that exercise
against ascertainable standards.").
51 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE:
A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 50 (1969)
49

("[T]he emphasis should not be on legislative clarification of standards but on administrative
clarification....").
52 DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY:
How CONGRESS ABUSES THE
PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 9, 14 (1993) ("When Congress delegates, it tends to so only half
its job-to distribute rights without imposing the commensurate duties.... Delegation shortcircuits [the democratic process] by allowing our elected lawmakers to hide behind unelected
agency officials.").
53
54

531 U.S. 457 (2001).
See id.at 472-78.
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E. The Principleof Self-Delegation
But we must also contend with Professor Manning's more subtle
argument, that the sophisticated radical textualist relies not on the
general non-delegation doctrine discussed above, but on the more specialized concept of self-delegation.
My first response to the self-delegation theory is that the making
or use of legislative history cannot qualify as any species of delegation, whether classified as "self-delegation" or the garden variety. As
Professor Siegel points out in his analysis of Manning's position, the
timing is all wrong.55 All of the judicial and scholarly analysis of the
delegation concept for more than two hundred years speaks to Congress giving away power to act in the future. But legislative history is
created before legislation is passed. As we have seen, the idea that
Congress may not delegate its legislative power is actually distinct
from and predates the theory of separation of powers. How can one
argue that a principle which rests on the notion that Congress's policymaking power belongs to the people, and thus cannot be given away,
can be violated by Congress's reliance on one of its own internal components? The writing of a committee report is always followed by
floor action on the bill itself. Even if one were to view legislative
history as delegation, it cannot be argued that Congress is thereby giving away its power to an entity outside of the legislative branch. Certainly delegating power to make national environmental policy to the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") feels very different indeed
from creating legislative history to explain Congress's understanding
of complex provisions of the Clean Air Act. The most important difference is that legislative history is not legally binding on anyone,
while validly promulgated rules under the Administrative Procedure
Act are. Yet Manning would conflate the two, and would even find
legislative history the more constitutionally suspect. It is therefore not
surprising that the creation and use of legislative history as a species
of non-delegation has escaped every scholar and judge who has written about the doctrine up until 1997.
It is also apparent that legislative history does not raise any of the
policy concerns that underlie the delegation doctrine and were so carefully explained by Chief Justice Rehnquist in the Benzene case. Some
55 See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System
of SeparatedPowers,

53 VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1460 (2000) ("It is true that the Constitution specially condemns congressional self-aggrandizement, but this new argument overlooks a simple yet critical point about
legislative history: most of it is created before a statute's passage, not afterwards. This crucial
detail takes most legislative history out of nondelegation doctrine, which is concerned with
grants of power to act in the future, not the past.").
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other forms of self-delegation might certainly raise those concerns.
So, if Congress attempts to empower a committee to decide important
questions of law in the future and treats those future determinations as
legally binding, one could argue that constitutionally suspect selfdelegation has taken place, though a more coherent constitutional objection would be the bypassing of Article I procedural constraints as in
Chadha. But empowering a committee to specify binding legal norms
in the future is not the same as the creation of pre-enactment legislative history.
Moreover, even if the creation and use of legislative history can be
thought of as "self-delegation," there is no logical reason for treating it
differently from other forms of delegation, and it should therefore be
constitutionally acceptable. Professor Manning argues that selfdelegation evades the constitutional checks of bicameral passage and
presentment, but so do other types of delegation. Though the Court
has come to accept delegation to agencies, it is quite clear that EPA's
exercise, for example, of the power to create clean air standards
evades the same constitutional safeguards-the binding standards that
emerge from rulemaking are created by unelected bureaucrats and not
by members of Congress. While Manning is concerned that selfdelegation in the form of legislative history allows members to evade
responsibility, that is also true of all delegations-it is the core of Professor Shoenbrod's powerful appeal for a return to an effective nondelegation principle.5 6 Quite often Congress lacks the political nerve
or the time to deal with difficult issues, and leaves them to agencies to
resolve. We do not find that process unconstitutional, though it is
sometimes deplorable.
In fact, if I were to concede that the creation of legislative history
can be seen as an instance of "self-delegation," which I do not, I
would argue that it should be treated with more, not less, respect and
deference than traditional delegation to executive branch agencies or
courts. This is partly because the creation of legislative history is subject to its own internal rules and constraints,57 ensuring control by the
elected representatives of the people. But more important, it is because the process of creating and relying on legislative history in the
enactment process is carried out pursuant to Congress's affirmative
constitutional power under Article I, Section 5, as argued in Parts VI
and VII.

See SHOENBROD, supranote 52, at 25-48,
99-108.
57 See infra Part
VII.
56
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F. Summary
There are many reasons, therefore, why attempting to use the nondelegation doctrine to constrain the use of legislative history is so unsatisfying. Analogies involving traditional delegation to agencies
seems strained. Applying the doctrine to events taking place during
the enactment process is clearly inconsistent with the basic purposes
of the doctrine, to ensure that policy decisions are made by the legislature and to constrain the activities of the executive branch. Even if the
non-delegation doctrine were to apply, it does not act as a prohibition
on any delegation, but merely requires that standards to guide discretion be enacted with the delegation, a notion that seems hard to apply
to Congress itself. Professor Manning's articulation of a special selfdelegation principle does not seem to rescue the underlying argument
about the relevance of non-delegation to legislative history.
All of these arguments make the non-delegation doctrine an inadequate doctrinal weapon for someone wishing to battle against the
rising tide of legislative history in statutory interpretation. Even more
important, as Parts VI and VII will demonstrate, there is another kind
of delegation argument pointing strongly in the opposite directionthat Congress's power to delegate to committees is a key part of its
Article I authority over the enactment process, which provides a constitutional basis for the authoritative use of legislative history.58 Therefore, not only are traditional principles counseling against the delegation of legislative power irrelevant in this context, but they should be
replaced in our thinking by a quite separate affirmative delegation that
is at the heart of the committee process in the House and Senate.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S ARTICLE I CASES AND LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY

While the arguments of the radical textualists make important use
of the concept of "self-delegation," as well as the policies underlying
the non-delegation doctrine, they also stress the relevance of the Supreme Court's recent cases concerning structural separation of powers
and Article I of the Constitution.

55 It is important to understand that "delegation" in the sense that Article I delegates to
Congress the power to determine its own enactment process, and to further delegate power to its
committees, is very different from the traditional "delegation" of the non-delegation doctrine.
Thus, Justice Stevens in his Bank One opinion can discuss the delegation by members to their
committee system, and still refuse the accept the argument that creating or using legislative
history violates the non-delegation doctrine. See Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank &
Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264,276 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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A. The Theory of Separationof Powers

Any argument that the use of pre-enactment committee reports to
resolve statutory ambiguities violates separation of powers principles
must be evaluated in light of our general understanding of those principles. In fact, deeper analysis leads to the conclusion that the doctrine of separation of powers in our Constitution is not by itself an
effective weapon to invalidate specific structural innovations, let alone
to justify a completely new way of understanding the role of congressional committees.
It is worth noting, to begin with, that our Constitution does not
contain any language mandating the separation of the three branches
of government. Some state constitutions, such as Virginia's, have
very specific provisions prohibiting one branch of government from
exercising the powers of the other. 5 By contrast, the federal Constitution states affirmatively the powers of each branch, without any prohibition on exercise by one of the powers of the other. As is well understood, the Framers were concerned about preventing abuses of power
by any of the branches, and so created a system of numerous specific
checks and balances-veto power for the President, override power
for the Congress; appointment power for the President, confirmation
power for the Senate; and so forth. Those gathered at Philadelphia
sought to construct a working government, in contrast to the hopelessly weak and ineffectual one created by the Articles of Confederation. The powers of the three branches are thus mixed in a very pragmatic way. As Professor Tribe puts it:
In understanding the division of authority among the
branches of the federal government or between the states and
the federal government, one must take into account how each
of these entities engages (and often shares) the powers of the
others. Although it is a misnomer as a matter of intellectual
history, "separation of powers" is often used as a shorthand
phrase for the complex system of checks and balances created
by the Constitution--checks and balances that in fact mingle
the different types of governmental power.... [T]he Constitution does not itself define "legislative," "executive," or "judicial" powers, and the functions assigned to each branch belie

59 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OFTHE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776-1787, at 15051 (1969) ("[Tlhat the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government ought to be
forever separate and distinct from each other.") (quoting MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. IV
(1776)).
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any suggestion that the Constitution establishes a strict separation. 60
Historians of the period have established that the Framers had
very complicated views about the notion of separation of powers, and
did not act from any overarching theory about the proper relationship
between the three parts of their new government. Professor Martin
Flaherty, in his review of the work of Forrest McDonald and other
intellectual historians, concludes that the Framers had abandoned any
formalistic notion of complete separation of functions in favor of a
system that relied on creating a balance among them. 61 Given this
background, it is difficult to argue that Congress's use of committees
"violates" this amorphous separation of powers principle, particularly
given the independent
grant of power to Congress under the Rulemak62
Clause.
ing
B. The Supreme Court'sApproach to Separation ofPowers
The Supreme Court, despite occasional lofty rhetoric, has recognized that our government is not one of strict separation of powers,
and that specific provisions limiting the exercise of each branch's
powers are far more important than any general theory of separation.
It has dealt with these issues in an important group of modern cases,
most of which involve efforts by Congress to create unusual governmental bodies or hybrid decision making structures. In Buckley v.
Valeo 63 the Court rejected Congress's effort to create a Federal Election Commission in which some of the members were directly appointed by Congress. In INS v. Chadha, 64 the Court struck down the
device of the one-house legislative veto of executive branch action.
And in Bowsher v. Synar 65 the Justices struck down still another hybrid congressional scheme, this time giving important decision making
powers under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings to the Comptroller General.
On the other hand, the Court approved of Congress's decision to give
decision making power over common law counterclaims to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in Commodity Futures Trading

60 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 2-5, at 136-37 (3d ed.
2000).
61 See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most DangerousBranch, 105
YALE W. 1725,

1756-1802

(1996).

62 See infra Parts VI
and VII.
63 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

6' 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
6 78 U.S. 714 (1986).
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Commission v. Schor.66 It upheld the independent counsel statute
against separation of powers attacks in Morrison v. Olson.67 And it
allowed Congress to create another unusual governmental body, the
Sentencing Commission, in Mistretta v. United States.6s
Scholars have struggled to explain and harmonize these decisions,
all of which arguably deal with the structural separation between the
branches of government and the degree to which the traditional functions of one can be exercised by another. If they all rest on separation
of powers theory, how can we explain the divergent outcomes? The
most convincing explanation is that given by Professor Krent. He
argues that what leads the Court to strike down structural experimentation in Chadha and Bowsher and to approve of it in Schor and Morrison is the fact that in the first two cases, specific provisions in the
Constitution detailing how the Congress must act were violated. 69 By
contrast, the Court was able to take a more forgiving and flexible approach to innovation in Schor and Morrison because no such specific
constitutional constraints were involved. In those cases, the Court
could engage in a more general balancing, using separation of powers
as a background principle rather than a rigid set of requirements. The
harder question, which the radical textualists have not satisfactorily
answered, is how these cases are relevant to the question whether
committee reports may be used to help interpret ambiguous statutory
language.
C. The Relevance of Chadha and Bowsher
Justice Scalia and Professor Manning place most of their reliance
in arguing that the use of legislative history violates separation of
powers in two cases-Chadhaand Bowsher. Therefore, the cases are
worth examining in some detail.
INS v. Chadha involved a one-house legislative veto provision in
the Immigration and Nationality Act, by which either the House or the
Senate could veto the suspension of an alien's deportation after it had
been ordered by the Attorney General. Chief Justice Burger's opinion
for a seven-to-two majority was a model of simplicity, and swept
away all related legislative veto provisions in the U.S. Code. There
was no broad rhetoric about the separation of powers principle in the
Constitution. Rather, the Chief Justice simply pointed to the require66 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
67 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
68 488 U.S. 361 (1989).

See Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separationof Powers Controversies,
74
VA. L. REv. 1253 (1988). See also DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 33, §§ 2.2-2.4, at 35-45.
69
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ment in Article I that legislation must be enacted by a vote of both
houses of Congress and presented to the President for signature or
possible veto. All actions by the Congress having the effect of legislation, reasoned Burger, must meet these explicit constitutional requirements. 70 The legislative veto, which required only the vote of one
house, clearly did not, and therefore was unconstitutional.
The obvious linchpin to this argument is the conclusion that the
action of one house to reverse the suspension decision of the Attorney
General was "legislation;" for if it was not, then it was not subject to
the requirements of Article I. The Chief Justice offers this test for
determining whether some unconventional action taken by the Congress is "legislation" for Article I purposes:
Examination of the action taken here by one House pursuant to § 244(c)(2) reveals that it was essentially legislative in
purpose and effect. In purporting to exercise power defined in
Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, to 'establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,' the House took action that had the purpose and effect of
altering the legal rights, duties and relations of persons, including the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and
Chadha, all outside the Legislative Branch. . . . The oneHouse veto operated in these cases to overrule the Attorney
General and mandate Chadha's deportation; absent the House
action, Chadha would remain in the United States. 71Congress
has acted and its action has altered Chadha's status.
There was no suggestion in the case that Congress's delegation of its
legislative power to a single house violated the non-delegation doctrine, though the radical textualists might surely make that argument
today, and of course there was no mention of any concept such as the
"self-delegation" principle now articulated by Justice Scalia and Professor Manning.
How, then, could the Chadhareasoning be applied to the act of either creating or using legislative history? We should note here that the
radical textualists have never been clear as to whether the constitutional violation they complain of occurs when legislative history is
first created or later when a court makes reference to it in a published
opinion. Since the idea that a court violates the Constitution by dis70 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (citation
omitted) ("It emerges clearly that
the prescription for legislative action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7 represents the Framers' decision that the
legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought
and exhaustively considered, procedure.").
71 1d at
952.
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cussing legislative history raises a whole host of new questions, let us
assume for our purposes they would argue that the violation occurs at
the time a committee report purporting to explain the purpose and
meaning of a statutory text is written. The radical textualists repeatedly say that Congress is attempting to substitute committee report
text that has not met the bicameralism and presentment requirements
for legally binding enacted text. But they are forgetting Chief Justice
Burger's key point-this can only run afoul of the Chadha rule if the
action in question alters the legal rights of persons outside the legislative branch. Committee report language simply cannot meet this test.
At the time of its creation, it affects no one's legal rights, because the
bill it accompanies has not yet been enacted, and may never be enacted.72 Even if one were to focus on later use of the language by
judges to clarify the meaning of the statute it accompanies, the use of
committee language is not itself "law" and judges do not treat it as
"law," any more than dictionaries and canons of interpretation used to
interpret statutory text are "law." 73 It does not by itself and independent of statutory text alter anyone's rights. Finally, I would observe, as
we have seen elsewhere, that committee report language rests upon its
own independent constitutional base 74 and has several other constitutionally legitimate purposes, such as informing members of the content of a proposed bill, creating a permanent public record of the bill's
course through Congress, and guiding executive branch agencies. It is
therefore extremely hard to accept the argument that pre-enactment
committee reports meet the Chadha test for legislative action, a prerequisite to a finding that the bicameralism and presentment clauses
have been violated.
Turning to Bowsher, it is difficult to see how the holding or reasoning in that case can be applied to the creation of legislative history,
as the radical textualists would have us do. Bowsher involved efforts
by Congress to create an automatic deficit-reduction mechanism in the
Professor Eskridge made this important observation in his 1990 article. See Eskridge,
supra note 17, at 674 ("Nothing said or done in the legislative process before the statute is enacted can be fairly said to invade judicial functions, so long as judges are free to consider all the
evidence of statutory meaning.").
73 Many critics of radical textualism have made this point. See, e.g., Breyer, supra
note 1,
at 863 ("No one claims that legislative history is a statute, or even that, in any strong sense, it is
'law."'); Schacter, supra note 1, at 639-40 ("[i1t is inappropriate for courts to regard themselves
as bound in any legal sense by words spoken or written during Congress's consideration of
legislation ....");Strauss, supra note 1, at 250 ("If, as at times the argument hints, Professor
Manning means only to say that it is inappropriate for courts to regard themselves as bound in
any legal sense by words spoken or written during Congress' consideration of legislation, his
case is easily made.").
74 See discussion of the Rulemaking Clause of Art. I, Section 5 infra Parts
VI, VII.
72
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Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law, to compensate for their own inability
to control spending. At issue was Section 251, which provided that
the Office of Management and Budget and the Congressional Budget
Office would make periodic reports to the Comptroller General on
whether spending exceeded the agreed-upon budget ceilings. If the
Comptroller General found that spending had in fact exceeded the
caps, he would report that fact to the President, who was required to
institute across-the-board spending cuts in the executive branch.7 5
Though Justice Scalia was not on the Supreme Court at the time
Bowsher was decided, he was a member of the three-judge court that
found the statute unconstitutional below, and did not signal any disagreement with the per curiam opinion filed by that court.7 6 That
opinion, which was referred to favorably by Chief Justice Burger in
the Court's opinion, found that the Comptroller General exercised
executive powers under this provision of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings.
Since the Comptroller General was removable at the initiation of Congress, he was not an appropriate officer in whom to entrust executive
powers. Even though it was unnecessary to their disposition of the
case, Judge Scalia and his colleagues went on to discuss the nondelegation doctrine, concluding that Congress had not violated that
principle when it enacted the statute. Congress had, they concluded,
given the Comptroller General sufficient guidance in the carrying out
of his statutory duties to satisfy the requirements of the non-delegation
cases. The opinion, presumably concurred in by Judge Scalia, does
not mention that delegation to an arm of Congress presents any special
Article I problem. Needless to say, it does not introduce the concept
of self-delegation either.
Chief Justice Burger, in his last opinion for the Court, agreed with
the lower court's analysis, finding in effect that Congress could not
tamper with the specific appointment and confirmation provisions for
appointment of executive officers in the Constitution. He concluded:
"The Constitution does not contemplate an active role for Congress in
the supervision of officers charged with the execution of the laws it
enacts."7 He also found support in Chadha for the Court's holding.
The vice of the legislative veto-allowing one house to act later to
change the law after its enactment-is analogous to Congress's retention of its removal power over the Comptroller General: "[A]s Chadha
makes clear, once Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation,
75 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985,
Pub. L. No. 99-177,

§252,99 Stat. 1037, 1072 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2,31 &42 U.S.C.).
76 See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374
(D.D.C. 1986).
'n Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,722
(1986).
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of
its participation ends. Congress can thereafter control the execution
'
its enactment only indirectly-by passing new legislation.' M
Many commentators have found the Court's rationale in Bowsher
unsatisfying, and prefer the more subtle analysis offered by Justice
Stevens in his concurring opinion. Articulating an extremely nuanced
view of the origin and operation of the separation of powers doctrine,
Justice Stevens is critical of the Court's finding that the powers exercised by the Comptroller General in this case were executive. The
Constitution gives us no test for determining which powers are executive or legislative, he argues, and the same power can be seen as legislative when exercised by the legislature and executive when exercised
by the executive branch. The power at issue here, to trigger the
across-the-board spending cuts, is a case in point. Justice Stevens sees
it as the power to put into place an important national policy, and thus
essentially legislative. He finds support for this conclusion in the fact
that Congress enacted a fall-back procedure in case Section 251 were
found unconstitutional, and that procedure involved Congress itself
making the decision. Justice Stevens thus concludes that the constitutional flaw in this case is that Congress has delegated power to do a
legislative act to a separate body, which is a functional part of the legislative branch. Citing Chadha, he writes:
Congress may not exercise its fundamental power to formulate
national policy by delegating that power to one of its two
Houses, to a legislative committee, or to an individual agent of
the Congress such as the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate, or the Director of
the Congressional Budget Office.79
On this theory, of course, Justice Stevens sees Bowsher as a close
analog to Chadha-both involved Congress attempting to change the
law without following the specific requirements set down by Article I
for legislating.
Considering either the reasoning of the majority or of Justice Stevens, does Bowsher have any relevance to the question at hand,
whether pre-enactment committee reports run afoul of these separation
of powers concerns? First, Bowsher rests on the same fundamental
premise as Chadha, that in order to create constitutional questions
these "acts" have to be legislative acts under Chadha (which we have
seen they are not) or perhaps executive acts under Bowsher. The
78
79

Id. at 733-34.
Id. at 737 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Court does not tell us what an executive act is, except to observe that
the Comptroller's action involves carrying out Congress's instructions,
akin to applying any law. Are the radical textualists arguing that each
time a committee writes a legislative report on a pending bill it is exercising the executive power? That seems highly illogical in light of
the fact that a statute does not exist at the time the committee report is
written. Moreover, courts have consistently held, and Congress has
conceded, that even after enactment its pre-enactment committee reports only guide the executive branch, but do not have the force of
law.8 ° If the test of an executive act is similar to the Chadha test for
legislative acts-binding effect on the legal rights of persons outside
the legislative branch-pre-enactment committee reports would
clearly fail it.
A more fundamental point to emphasize in this effort to apply
Chadha and Bowsher to legislative history is that both of those cases
involved efforts by a governmental body to alter the legal status quo at
some time after the enactment of legislation empowering it to act.
Legislative history, on the other hand, is created before the measure in
question becomes law. The underlying concern, explicitly articulated
by Justice Stevens in his Bowsher opinion, is that by delegating to a
part of itself the power to change the effect of a law in the future,
Congress could evade the Constitutional restraints on its action (bicameralism and the veto) and thus undermine democratic accountability. 81 But the analogy to legislative history creation simply fails. Legislative history is not treated by any of the actors as binding in the
legal sense. Taking the time of enactment as the constitutionally crucial point for our analysis, the making of legislative history looks
backward, not forward as in Chadha and Bowsher. Legislative history
may be an attempt by the relevant committees to clarify and explain
Congress's action during the process of passage, but it is legally superseded by the enactment of the legislation that follows. Analytically, therefore, it cannot be made subject to the separation of powers
arguments made by the radical textualists, and is simply unaffected by
the Court's reasoning in Chadhaand Bowsher.
D. Chadha, Bowsher, and Self-Delegation
Professor Manning relies on Chadha and Bowsher to argue that
legislative history is self-delegation of a special sort, and is inconsistent with Article I. He sees those two cases as validation by the Su80 See infra Part VII.E.I.
81 See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 714, 737-41,748-59
(1986).
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preme Court of his theory. The Court is saying, in his interpretation,
that Congress cannot use the delegation of interpretive power to committees or individual legislators to circumvent Article I requirements,
and participate directly in application of the laws. That law elaboration function is reserved to the executive branch, and when statutes
must be interpreted, to the courts.
But Manning simply ignores the inconvenient fact that the Court
in Chadha and Bowsher does not mention self-delegation, let alone
adopt it as its rationale. As we have seen, the majority in Chadharests
on non-compliance with the procedural requirements for legislation in
Article I, and the Bowsher Court relies on the specific method of appointing executive branch officers in Article II. In the one case where
the theory now advocated by Scalia and Manning might have been
relevant, Nixon v. United States,82 the Court, in an opinion concurred
in by Justice Scalia, never mentions the issue of self delegation, even
though it would seem to be relevant in a case where Senate delegated
its power to try an impeachment to a committee.
Even if one were to concede that self-delegation of the power to
elaborate the law is the "real" rationale of these cases, application of
the principle to pre-enactment legislative history would be illogical.
As already noted, a self-delegation principle under Article I would
indeed be violated if Congress were to empower one of its committees
to make legally binding policy determinations in the future. That
would clearly seem to violate the intention of the Framers that legislation should have to run the gamut of two quite different legislative
chambers and a possible Presidential veto. But though Professor
Manning writes as if it is binding "law," legislative history carries no
such binding effect. It certainly does not alter legal rights like the
action of the House in overriding the Attorney General's decision to
allow Chadha to remain in the country. And it does not make an important determination of national budget policy like the decision of the
Comptroller General to trigger budget reductions in Bowsher. Once
the Congress has created its committee reports as aids to statutory
interpretation, and for other reasons, it possesses no power to direct
how they shall be used, and courts may and do ignore them. It is still
the judge, not a congressional committee, who decides the application
of a statute to the facts of the case at hand.
Finally, the entire law elaboration argument articulated by Professor Manning is simply carried too far. Despite Chief Justice Burger's
comment in Bowsher that "once Congress makes its choice in enacting
legislation, its participation ends," that limitation cannot be taken lit82

506 U.S. 224 (1993). See infra the discussion in Part VI.D.
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erally. The Framers contemplated that Congress would participate in
the administration of the laws in many ways, including confirmation
of executive branch appointments and withholding funds. As is
widely known, Congress is involved daily in the application of the
laws it passes-by oversight hearings, investigations by the Comptroller General, meetings with executive branch officials, public excoriation of policies, and individual pressure.8 3 As noted in Part VII, the
entire budget and appropriations process abounds in informal mechanisms for Congress to influence executive branch action, and the
legality of this process has never been questioned by the Court. If
there is a doctrine prohibiting Congress from participating in law
elaboration, it is restricted to efforts by one house or a committee to
make legally binding applications of a statute after it has been passed.
No one suggests that committee reports and other kinds of legislative
history are binding on courts or agencies in the legal sense.
E. Summary
Like the non-delegation argument, to which it is closely connected, the separation of powers arguments of the radical textualists
are ultimately unconvincing. The legislative schemes condemned in
Chadha and Bowsher are too different from the familiar process of
creating a committee report to sustain the analogy. Moreover, the
softness of the overarching separation of powers theory on which our
system is based fatally weakens a more general argument that use of
legislative history violates that theory.
We have now seen that the effort by radical textualist scholars and
judges to attack the constitutional legitimacy of legislative history
materials is unpersuasive. But that does not leave the issue of the legitimacy of committee reports in constitutional limbo. It remains now
to look at the affirmative case for the legitimacy of legislative history
in our constitutional system. We will focus particularly on the neglected Rulemaking Clause of the Constitution as a source of Congress's power to create and utilize an authoritative committee process,
and ultimately as a solid justification for a judge's reliance on committee reports in the interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions.

83

One of the most perceptive students of Congress, Louis Fisher, has often made this point

in arguing against the reasoning of Chadha. See, e.g., Louis Fisher, Micromanagement by Congress: Reality and Mythology, in FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 252-53 (Peter H.
Schuck ed., 1994) (characterizing notion that Congress' participation in executing laws is limited
to enacted new legislation as "nonsense").
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V. ARTICLE I AND THE ENACTMENT PROCESS
A. Overview of Article I
Radical textualist judges like Justice Scalia and scholars like Professor Manning, as we have seen, rest one of their principal objections
to the authoritative use of committee reports in statutory interpretation
squarely on the Constitution. More particularly, they argue that only
the language of legislation itself can be considered by a judge in the
process of statutory interpretation, because only the text has been subject to bicameral passage and presentment to the President as required
by Article I, Section 7.84 This is fundamentally an argument about the
constitutional legitimacy of committee reports and the congressional
committee process itself. It draws a stark distinction between legislative text as voted on by both legislative chambers and committee language contained in the reports accompanying the legislation. In the
preceding parts of the Article, we have seen that the radical textualist
arguments premised on the non-delegation doctrine and more general
separation of powers concerns are analytically weak. We now turn to
the second half of my response, that the Rulemaking Clause of Article
I, Section 5 is an important independent source of constitutional legitimacy for written committee reports that accompany reported bills
(and, even more clearly, for conference committee reports). My overall purpose is to arm those who advocate careful use of legislative
history sources as a necessary contextual device to explain vague statutes with a new and explicitly constitutional justification.
So now we turn to Article I of the Constitution. Before proceeding
to look closely at the Rulemaking Clause, we would do well to pause
for a moment to seek a clearer understanding of the principles of bicameral passage and presentment to the President that are relied upon
so heavily by textualists. As the Supreme Court in Chadha and other
cases has observed, these principles are derived from Sections 1 and 7
of Article I; the Court's opinions have spoken of them as two of the
most important and inflexible requirements of our written Constitution. 85 While an enormous analytical weight has been placed on biSee supra Parts I and
Ii
See, e.g., Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 436-42 (1998) ("Familiar
historical materials provide abundant support for the conclusion that the power to enact statutes may only 'be
exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure."');
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-51 (1983) ("Explicit and unambiguous provisions of the
Constitution prescribe and define the respective functions of the Congress and of the Executive
in the legislative process."). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 118-25 (1975) (per curiam)
("The principle of separation of powers was not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of
the Framers: it was woven into the document that they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of
1787.").
84

85
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cameral passage and presentment in our orthodox constitutional thinking, it is surprising to read the words themselves and observe their
context. As for Article I, Section 1-the very first sentence of the
body of the Constitution-the Framers were content to simply state
that "[a]l legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House
of Representatives," without any specific provision detailing the relationship between the houses or the manner of enacting statutes. We
know that the decision to create two separate houses of different sizes,
modes of election, terms, and qualifications was one of the most important made at the Constitutional Convention,86 but little attention
was given to the process of creating legislation. Article I, Section 7,
by contrast, has been the subject of much academic and judicial analysis, and begins as follows:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be
presented to the President of the United States; If he approve
he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections
to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter
the Objections
at large on their Journal, and proceed to recon87
sider it.
The text then continues to set out at some length the mechanics of
veto and override, key elements in the Constitution's system of checks
and balances between the branches. What is interesting about this
portion of Article I is that the ideas of bicameralism and presentment
are not set out as independent principles, subjects in their own right,
but rather are mere procedural incidents to the real subject of Section
7-the Presidential veto and congressional override mechanism.
Thus, even though it is often stated that the Constitution requires that a
bill pass both houses in identical form before presentation to the
President, no explicit language to that effect can be found in Article I.
One might at least conceive of a system in which both houses passed
86 The Framers desired to make it difficult to pass legislation because
they feared the
excesses that had plagued past Colonial legislatures. To make the House closer to the people,
direct election, shorter terms, and smaller districts were created. To make the Senate representative of the states, election by state legislatures and longer terms were created.
87 U.S. CONST. art I, § 7. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
Even
the Supreme Court has tacitly recognized what the Constitution and the Federalist Papers make
clear, that Art. I, § 7 is an intricate procedural clause explaining the process by which the President can veto a bill and Congress can override it. See Chadha,462 U.S. at 948-49 ("The bicameral requirement of Art. I, §§ 1, 7, was of scarcely less concern to the Framers than was the
Presidential veto and indeed the two concepts are interdependent.")(emphasis added).
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bills that differed slightly in their language, with the differences reconciled by the President before signing; or one in which the last house
to act on a bill controlled the final language, with no second vote by
the first house. Over the years, courts and commentators have simply
assumed that since we have two "Houses" and only one "Law" signed
by the President, the two houses are required to devise some system
for agreeing on the same language in a single "Bill."
Even though scholars and the Supreme Court have treated bicameralism and presentment as clear and immutable ideas, both have actually developed as more flexible concepts. Consider the key word
"passed" in Article I, Section 7, for example. One might suppose that
it requires members of each chamber to vote in person, with a quorum
of a majority plus one actually present, on each bill, with some requirement that the members understand the bill text. Reading Justice
Scalia's criticisms of congressional standing committees, and his reverence for actual floor votes on the text of a bill, one might fairly conclude that he clings to such a naive interpretation of the term "passed."
The reality of passage, of course, is quite different. There is no requirement in our law that legislators have a reasonable factual basis
for the legislation they pass, 88 that they understand the text of the bill,

or even that they have read it at all. The key principle of a presumptive quorum--that a quorum exists until someone asks for proofmeans that many bills are passed with only a minority of members
present and voting. Indeed, by long-standing practice, not specifically
addressed in House or Senate rules, bills are passed with only one
member of the majority present, by unanimous consent. Hardly "passage" in the commonsense meaning of that word, yet allowed under
88 See Towsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441,451 (1937)
(noting that "[t]here is no principle
of constitutional law which nullifies action taken by a legislature in the absence of a special

investigation"). See also Palladio v. Diamond, 321 F. Supp. 630, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440
F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1971) ("[T]here is no constitutional requirement that the legislature conduct
hearings and build a record when it passes a law."); id. ("[A] statute must be judged constitutional if any set of facts which can reasonably be conceived would sustain it."); id. ("No case has
ever held that a [legislative] record is constitutionally required."). Using this legal principle and
reasoning, numerous other cases have held that government need not hold hearings and allow for

those persons affected by legislation to address the legislature. See, e.g., Minnesota State Bd. for
Cmty. Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984) (holding that the Constitution does not grant
to members of the public generally a right to be heard by public bodies making decisions of
policy); Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130 (1983) (holding that food stamp recipients had no
special right to advance notice of eligibility amendment to Food Stamp Act); Nat'l Amusements
v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 746 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting the impracticability of allowing the
public a direct voice in the adoption of a general state statute). Granted, saying that there is no
general rationality requirement for legislation is somewhat of an over-simplification. Courts
sometimes inquire into purpose and motivation where invidious discrimination or violation of
fundamental rights is alleged. See generally WILLIAM D. PoPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 966-92 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing the "de-

liberative model" of legislative rationality).
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the vitally important corollary to the Rulemaking Clause of Article I,
Section 5-that any rule either house is free to make, it is equally free
to amend, repeal, suspend, ignore, or waive. Legislative bodies could

hardly function at all without such shortcuts. 89 Moreover, one might
as an original proposition assume that "passed" implies a process by
which a majority may bring any measure it wishes to a vote, and obtain a vote on any proposed amendment to the text. But procedural
barriers in both houses, and particularly the functioning of the filibuster in the Senate and Rules Committee in the House, create a much

more restricted, less majoritarian system.
Perhaps most startling, in light of the Court's language about the
procedural requirements of legislating in Article I, the enrolled bill
rule prevents a judge from going behind the certified text of a bill,
or
even when it may be apparent that the text as passed by the House
90
the Senate is not the same text as that signed by the President.
In truth, we have no idea how far Congress might push the constitutional concept that a bill must be "passed," because House and Senate rules are actually quite conservative on this score. Certainly, voting by proxy, though not now allowed on the floor of the House and
Senate, could be done on regular legislation if a majority chose to
adopt it by rule. In my view, House and Senate rules could provide
that a bill approved by a standing committee, and subject to unanimous consent objections, could be passed without any actual event
taking place on the floor at all and still be valid under the Rulemaking
The Senate has three different types of votes-roll call, voice (in which no actual count
is made) and division (the equivalent of a show of hands, with only the result announced and not
the names or numbers of those voting for and against). In actuality, however, there is a fourth
voting mechanism, usually used for unimportant matters. Former Senate Parliamentarian Floyd
Riddick notes that bills can also be passed by a much quicker method, which requires only one
member to be present: "Frequently, the Chair will state, 'Without objection the amendment, bill,
resolution, motion etc. is agreed to (or not agreed to)."' FLOYD RIDDICK, RIDDICK'S SENATE
PROCEDURE, S. Doc. NO. 101-28, at 1397 (1992). 'This is merely an abbreviated way of putting
the question on a voice vote, and does not imply that the proposition can be defeated by one
objection. However, any Senator may object to putting the question in this manner, in which
case the vote will occur by one of the other methods.. ." Id. at 1397. Occasionally, important
bills are approved by unanimous consent. A recent example is the package of bills known as the
Contract With America Advancement Act of 1996, P.L. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847, approved March
29, 1996. This legislation included, in Title II, the provisions for review and disapproval of
agency rules, which were used by Republicans to block rules promulgated in the waning weeks
of the Clinton administration. The entire legislative package was passed in the Senate by unanimous consent under a previous agreement, and there is no actual moment of passage recorded in
the Congressional Record. 104 CONG. REC. S6808 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1996). One wonders how
a radical textualist would evaluate the legitimacy of this statutory text.
90 See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) (holding that various
importers protesting
against government assessment could not present evidence from congressional sources to assert
that the act creating the assessments was not contained in the bill authenticated by congressional
officers and approved by the President). See also discussion at Part VI.C. infra.
89
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Clause. 91 The only bedrock requirement, it seems, is that the presiding
officer of each chamber must certify to "passage" and a formal text
92
must be prepared for the other house or the President to act on.
In light of the unmistakable primacy accorded to committee reports by congressional rules and practices, which I demonstrate in Part
VII, one could logically argue that an additional reason for consulting
committee reports in interpreting ambiguous statutes is that the constitutional term "passed" includes the entire enactment process adopted
by Congress under the Rulemaking Clause. Such a conclusion would
certainly be no more of a stretch than the other practices deemed compatible with passage under Article I, as discussed above.
Likewise, the constitutional notion of "presentment" does not necessarily mean what it seems to mean. It certainly does not require a
physical presentation to the actual President by the actual presiding
officer of the originating chamber. Courts have found that a bill may
be presented by a standing committee of the originating house, and
that it may be done by staff members after the house has adjourned.93
Indeed, the entire veto mechanism so carefully set down in Article I,
Section 7 has been considerably streamlined by the federal courts over
the years to recognize modern legislative realities regarding recesses
and adjournments. 4
During the all-too-frequent chaos over unpassed spending bills at the
beginning of the
2001 fiscal year, the New York Times reported that the Senate, with only the presiding officer and
one other member present, adopted a resolution that would "deem" any one-day spending measure adopted by the House and sent to the Senate in the following twelve days as automatically
approved. The Senate then went out of session until November 15. Such a procedure would
seem to violate anyone's interpretation of the word "passed." See Steven A. Holmes, Half Open
Congress Keeps Money Flowing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2000, at A20. As note 89 supra points
out, the Contract With America Advancement Act of 1996 passed the Senate under a previous
unanimous consent agreement with no actual moment of passage recorded.
92 An interesting state case carrying deference to legislative
voting practices very far is
Heimbach v. State, 454 N.Y.S.2d 993 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). The case involved the state senate's "fast roll call" procedure, under which a member who had checked in as present during the
legislative day could be voted in favor of any bill by the leadership. The bill in question passed
by one vote, and Senator Nolan alleged that he had erroneously been counted as a vote in favor
although he in fact opposed the bill and had not been on the floor for the vote. Confusion about
the working of the fast roll call procedure was the culprit; had Nolan been counted as absent the
bill would have been defeated under New York's constitutional majority requirement. The New
York court refused to declare the bill void, arguing that the senate had broad power to decide on
the meaning of the state constitution's roll call provision, even when, as here, it resulted in "erroneous" passage of the bill.
93 See, e.g., Mester Mfg. Co. v. INS, 879 F.2d 561,
570-71 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 was properly presented to the President after
Congress adjourned sine die); United States v. Kapsalis, 214 F.2d 677, 679-83 (7th Cir. 1954)
(holding that although three criminal statutes were presented to the President after Congress had
adjourned, the President's approval of the bills within ten days of presentation complied with the
presentment requirements of U.S. CONST. art. I, §7, cl. 2).
94 See Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
("The principle that we believe
91
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Bicameral passage and presentment, then, may not be the unchangeable constitutional principles we so often suppose them to be,
but somewhat more flexible requirements. The so-called "requirement" that a bill be passed in identical language by both houses does
not appear in the Constitution; it is a practical conclusion derived from
the existence of two legislative chambers juxtaposed against the requirement in a rational legal system that there be a single agreed-upon
text for a law imposing duties on citizens.
While there has been surprisingly little thoughtful analysis by
judges or scholars of the bicameralism and presentment requirements
of Article I, Section 7, virtually no attention has been given to the
Rulemaking Clause of Article I, Section 5, at least in the context of the
debate over the authoritativeness of committee reports. Yet the Rulemaking Clause, unlike bicameral passage and presentment, is not an
adjunct to another more crucial principle (the veto, one of the key
checks in the Constitution) but a separate clause explicitly setting out
Congress's unfettered power to control the enactment process. The
full text is as follows: "Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly 95
Behaviour, and, with
the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.,
The text of Article I contains a few specific procedural requirements-for voting, keeping a journal, etc.-but the Rulemaking
Clause is an unmistakable delegation by the Constitution to the House
and Senate to devise their own enactment processes. Consequently, it
provides constitutional legitimacy to rules later adopted by both
houses establishing a committee system and relying on it to craft legislation, explain its meaning, and manage its consideration on the floor.
To fully understand the constitutional position of the legislative committee process and the written reports stemming from it, one must look
not only at the traditional bicameralism and presentment language, as
the textualists do, but at the Rulemaking Clause as well. For if Congress, exercising its own constitutional power to devise an enactment
process of its choosing, vests authoritative power in its committee
system and uses committee reports to explain its legislative acts, then

runs through Pocket Veto [Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929)] and Wright [Wright v. United
States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938)] is a simple one: whenever Congress adjourns, return of a veto
message to a duly authorized officer of the originating house will be effective only if, under the
circumstances of that type of adjournment, such a procedure would not occasion undue delay or
uncertainty over the returned bill's status."); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 440 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (returning a bill by the President under veto mechanism is not prevented by an intrasession
adjournment, so long as the originating house is capable of receiving the message). These cases
effectively amended the pocket veto in the Constitution.
95 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5,
cl. 2.
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the courts should respect that decision and should consult committee
reports as aids in establishing the meaning of ambiguous statutory
texts. Because this is a key element in my overall argument, I now
turn to an in-depth exploration of the Rulemaking Clause.
B. History of the Rulemaking Clause
The notion that a legislative body has the inherent power to create
enactment processes that satisfy its own needs must have seemed selfevident and non-controversial to the Framers. Representative bodies
have created rules to govern their proceedings for centuries.9 6 Several
of the early state constitutions had provisions similar to the Rulemaking Clause. 97 The Articles of Confederation did not contain such language, but the legislative body it created adopted its own rules as a
matter of course.98 Incidentally, Article IX of the Articles of Confederation
explicitly gave that legislature the power to appoint commit9
9

tees.

Compared with the great issues facing the Framers in Philadelphia
in the summer of 1787, something as basic as the power of a legislature to determine its own enactment process was probably seen as
unworthy of debate. Most of the delegates had been active members
of their respective colonial legislatures and were familiar with the procedures of the English Parliament; 1°0 they probably took for granted
96

See 2 ROBERT C. BYRD, THE SENATE, 1789-1989, ADDRESSES
ON THE HISTORY OF THE

SENATE, S. Doc. NO. 100-20, 45-57 (1988) [hereinafter 2 BYRD].

See also ROBERT LUCE,

LEGISLATIVE PRINCIPLES: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF LAWMAKING BY REPRESENTATIVE

GOVERNMENT 51-81 (1971). Cf. THE HISTORY OF PARLIAMENTARY BEHAVIOR (William 0.

Aydelotte
ed., 1977).
97
See, e.g., VA. CONST. (1776); 1 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, 1725-1792,
299-3 10
(Robert A. Rutland ed., 1970) Mason's final draft of the Virginia Constitution, which was enacted verbatim, contained the following provision: "[Elach House shall choose its own speaker,
appoint its ovn officers, settle its own rules of proceeding, and direct writs of election for supplying intermediate vacancies." Id. at 305.
See MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING
THE CONFEDERATION 1781-1789, 399-421 (1950); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1789, 354-63 (1969).
99 THE
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX (1781) ("The [U]nited [S]tates
in congress

assembled shall have authority.., to appoint such other committees and civil officers as may be
necessary for managing the general affairs of the [tJ]nited [S]tates .... ").
I00 This point is borne
out by Jefferson's Manual, the remarkable procedural guide written
by Thomas Jefferson to assist in the performance of his duties as presiding officer of the Senate
from 1797 to 1801. Even today his manual is printed as part of the official volume containing
House rules and precedents, and in the House it still serves as a source of parliamentary rulings
when other explicit rules do not resolve the question at hand. In the preface to his manual, Jefferson explicitly acknowledges that his procedural principles are derived from the English and
colonial practices and that he repeatedly refers to them to resolve procedural questions. See
THOMAS JEFFERSON, Jefferson's Manual of ParliamentaryPractice (1797), in CONSTITUTION,
JEFFERSON'S MANUAL AND RULES

OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED
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much of the basic structure and procedure of legislative bodies. We
know that the Framers formed a committee to draft rules for their own
deliberations on the Convention's first day, and adopted rules several
days later. 101 A Rulemaking Clause was not included in the Virginia
Plan as originally presented to the Convention, though a version of it
was in Pinckney's draft plan: "Each House shall appoint its own
Speaker and other Officers, and settle its own Rules of Proceeding...
.,102 The language of the final constitutional provision appears first in
the report of the Committee of Detail on August 6, in Article VI, Section 6.103 The Committee of Style and Arrangement, led by Gouverneur Morris, rearranged the provisions and made minor adjustments, and when presented to the Convention for final debate and
adoption, the Rulemaking Clause rested in Article I, Section 5.104
There is no record of discussion in the Convention on the inherent
powers of the House and Senate to control the details of the enactment
process or on the need for an explicit Rulemaking Clause for the national legislature. Likewise, no references to the Rulemaking Clause
appear in the Federalist Papers. Again, such a self-evident point was
unlikely to be discussed in light of the great issues of representation of
the states, the status of slaves in counting population for the House,
the powers of the Congress, and the like. By the same token, there
was apparently no discussion in Philadelphia or in the Federalist Papers of bicameral enactment as a separate constitutional principle-the
105
subject is touched upon only in the context of the veto mechanism.
Early scholarly explanations and analyses of the Constitution
likewise devote little attention to the Rulemaking Clause or to bicameral enactment as a separate constitutional principle. The most influential of these, Joseph Story's Commentaries, makes it clear that the

STATES, ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS, H.R. Doc. No. 106-320 (2000).
101 See ARTHUR TAYLOR PRESCOTr, DRAFTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 37-42 (1941);
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 2-10 (Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ.
Press 1937) (1911) [hereinafter RECORDS OFTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION].
102 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra
note 101, at 605.
103 See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note
101, at 180 ("Each House

may determine the rules of its proceedings ....
1

IId. at 592.

105

See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 101, at 334-68. The desir-

ability of a balanced legislature of two quite different houses was of course a major topic of
debate, as the Framers had experience with runaway legislative bodies. The discussion of bicameralism at the Convention consisted largely of debate over the necessity of a two-house
legislature and the methods of election (direct or through state legislatures) of the members of the
legislature. See id. at 585-87; THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 48, 58, 62 (James Madison), Nos. 67,
73 (Alexander Hamilton).
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power to control internal proceedings is inherent in the legislative
power in Article I:
No person can doubt the propriety of the provision authorizing
each house to determine the rules of its own proceedings. If
the power did not exist, it would be utterly impracticable to
transact the business of the nation, either at all, or at least with
decency, deliberation, and order. The humblest assembly of
men is understood to possess this power; and it would be ab06
surd to deprive the councils of the nation of a like authority.1
C. JudicialInterpretationsof the Rulemaking Clause
Federal courts have only infrequently had the opportunity to interpret the Rulemaking Clause of Article I, Section 5, and thus to discuss
the scope of Congress's power to determine the rules of its own
proceedings. The few relevant Supreme Court cases, and a larger
number of court of appeals opinions, show both doctrinal confusion
and an understandable reluctance to judge the internal rules of the
House and Senate. Most often, courts have used a variety of doctrines, including political question, standing, equitable discretion, and
general separation of powers concerns, to avoid ruling on the validity
of such rules and practices. On the narrower question I posewhether Congress has the power under the Rulemaking Clause to
create an authoritative committee system and rely on it as a source of
help in interpreting statutes-the answer from case law is somewhat
clearer. Both the Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia have stressed the breadth of the Rulemaking
Clause, and no court has struck down a congressional rule involving
the enactment process itself.
1. Supreme Court Opinions
There have been few Supreme Court cases that directly pose questions about the scope and effect of the Rulemaking Clause of Article I,
Section 5. The first and most important of the Court's forays into this
sensitive area came in 1892, in two contemporaneous cases involving
tariff legislation.
1°7
Field v. Clark,
challenged
the validity
particular
tariffInlegislation
becauseimporters
a key provision
contained
in bothofthe
House

106 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES

(Leonard W. Levy ed., Da Capo Press 1970) (1833).
'07 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
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and Senate versions was somehow omitted from the enrolled bill presented to the President for his signature. The justices conceded that
whether the bill passed by Congress is the same as that signed by the
President raises a valid issue under the Constitution. °8 But they went
further to hold that courts are not permitted to look behind the official
signatures of the two chambers' presiding officers in deciding such a
question. 10 9 Under this so-called "enrolled bill rule," also common in
many states, judges may not examine the written journal of the chamber, or consider any other extrinsic evidence of procedural flaws in the
enactment process. 110 They must accept the enrolled bill at face value,
since any other conclusion would plunge a court into the difficult
process of evaluating legislative procedures. Powerful separation of
powers concerns, then, counsel the adoption of such a prophylactic
rule, which blocks all inquiry into the alleged procedural flaws in a
bill's adoption.
Decided the same day as Field,Ballin v. United States"' involved
a direct challenge to congressional voting procedures used at the time.
The tariff statute at issue had been passed by a vote of 138 in favor, 3
against, with 189 present but not voting. As the Court notes, the Constitution requires that a quorum be present when a roll call vote is
taken. 1 2 In order to counter the tactic of blocking legislative action by
refusing to answer the quorum call even while present, House rules at
the time allowed the presiding officer to count toward the quorum
members who were in the chamber but not voting. 113 Justice Brewer
noted that the Constitution is silent as to the method of computing or
determining a quorum, and that the Rulemaking Clause gives Congress the power to resolve such questions. 114 Despite Field, which
See id. at 672 (addressing the contention "that [an act] cannot be regarded as a
law of the
United States if the journal of either house fails to show that it passed in the precise form in
which it was signed by the presiding officers of the two houses, and approved by the President").
109 See id. at 673 (rejecting a rule that would make
"the validity of Congressional enactments depend upon the manner in which the journals of the respective houses are kept by the
subordinate officers charged with the duty of keeping them").
110 See ABNER MiKVA & ERIC LANE, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 592-98 (1995). "The enrolled
bill rule creates less opportunity for judicial review of legislative proceedings." Id. at 596.
111 144 U.S. 1 (1892).
112 Id at 5-6. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. ("Each
House shall be the Judge of Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a
Quorum to do Business ....
").
113See Ballin, 144 U.S. at 5 ("'On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion
of the
Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the house who do not
vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the
names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining the presence of a
quorum to do business."') (quoting the House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890).
114 See id. at 6 ('But how shall the presence of a majority be determined? The Constitution
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would seem to bar examination of the journal to determine the vote,
the Court did look at the journal.
The Ballin opinion has created confusion because of the apparent
inconsistency between its holding and some of its language. On the
question presented, Justice Brewer is clear. The Court may not second-guess the House's choice of a quorum rule: "Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present
any matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is
only one of power. The constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings."' 15 But the opinion goes on to add three
limitations, even though none was at issue in this case: "It may not by
its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights,
and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method
of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to
be attained.""' 6 The first two examples-rules that may violate other
specific limitations in the Constitution, and rules that violate the rights
of persons outside the Congress-figure in a number of later cases.
The third-rules that may be unreasonable-apparently was not taken
seriously by the Court because it has never been applied in a subsequent case. Indeed it would allow deep and wholesale intrusion into
the affairs of Congress, conflicting with these additional words of Justice Brewer:
[Wlithin these limitations all matters of method are open to
the determination of the house, and it is no impeachment of
the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a
rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a
length of time. The power to make rules is not one which
once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always
subject to be exercised by the house, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any
other body or tribunal.' 17
Thus, despite the looseness of some of its dicta, BaUin supports a
very expansive interpretation of the Rulemaking Clause. It has not
always been so read by judges of the courts of appeals, as we shall see.

has prescribed no method of making this determination, and it is therefore within the competency
of the house to prescribe any method which shall be reasonably certain to ascertain the fact.").
Id.at5.
116
117

Id.
Id.
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The Court did not return to these issues for 40 years, until United
States v. Smith." 8 There, the Justices considered the effect of a Senate
rule that permitted the chamber to reconsider its vote to advise and
consent to a nomination, even after its approval had been forwarded to
the President and the appointment made. The Court here construed
the Senate rule, despite Ballin, on the ground that what was involved
was not a rule affecting only the Senate. 119 Rather, it implicated the
President's appointment power and the validity of a federal office. It
was therefore not inconsistent with the general position that rules and
practices effecting only the internal enactment process itself are completely within Congress's discretion.
Likewise, the next two cases the Court decided-Christoffel v.
United States12° and Yellin v. United States M-also involved the
Court's interpretation of House and Senate rules, but are not inconsistent with Ballin. Both cases involved the rights of witnesses before
congressional committees, and therefore fell under the fundamental
rights exception discussed in Ballin. For this reason, they are not directly relevant to the narrower question under discussion here.
On two occasions in the 1990s, the Supreme Court again took up
the question of the scope of the Rulemaking Clause in cases involving
aspects of the enactment process itself. In United States v. Munoz22
Flores,1
the Court was faced with the question of whether a particular piece of legislation complied with the constitutional requirement
that all bills for the raising of revenue originate in the House. It found
that the issue was justiciable.1 3 Again, this is consistent with Ballin
and the more general principle that Congress has complete discretion
over its own enactment rules, because Munoz-Flores involved a separate constitutional requirement, explicitly set out in Article 1. 124 On the
merits, Justice Marshall found that the measure in question was not1 a
revenue bill and therefore the constitutional provision did not apply. 21
The case is particularly interesting for our purposes because of
Justice Scalia's concurrence. He argued forcefully that the enrolled
286 U.S. 6 (1932).
See id. at 33 ("As the construction to be given to the rules affects persons other
than
members of the Senate, the question presented is of necessity a judicial one.").
12D 338 U.S. 84,87-90
(1949).
121 374 U.S. 109, 110-24
(1963).
122 495 U.S. 385
(1990).
123 L at 387.
118

119

124 Id. at 387-88. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 ("All Bills
for raising Revenue shall
originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.").
12 See Munoz-Flores,495 U.S.
at 397-401.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 52:489

bill rule articulated in Field v. Clark prevented the Court from deciding the case-the bill on its face indicated that it had originated in the
House. 126 He would thus support judicial deference to congressional
decisions on procedure even in a case where a specific constitutional
requirement is involved, broadening the apparent holding in Ballin.
Despite his disdain for the committee system and Congress's reliance
on it in interpreting statutes, Justice Scalia states most strongly that in
this context:
We should no more gainsay Congress' official assertion of
the origin of a bill than we would gainsay its official assertion that the bill was passed by the requisite quorum ....
Mutual regard between the coordinate branches, and the interest of certainty, both demand that official representations
regarding such matters of internal process be accepted at face
value.' 27
It could well be pointed out that the thrust of this argument is inconsistent with his assertions that despite Congress's reliance on the
committee system and its written product, the Supreme Court is entitled to ignore them in the process of giving meaning to ambiguous
statutory provisions.
The Supreme Court's most recent discussion of these issues came
in Nixon v. United States,128 a case involving a challenge by an impeached federal judge to the use of a trial committee in the Senate.
Despite the constitutional duty to "try" impeachment cases, 129 the
Senate had adopted a rule leaving fact finding to a small hearing
committee, with debate and final vote in the full Senate.1 30 This case
is thus particularly relevant to the question of the authoritativeness of
the committee system in statutory interpretation. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, in an opinion Justice Scalia joined, held the challenge to be
non-justiciable. He found the constitutional delegation to the Senate
of the "sole power" to try impeachment to warrant complete judicial
deference. The Court thus allowed a Senate committee to try Judge
Nixon. While the case did not technically involve the more general
rulemaking power of Article I, Section 5, the larger point is the same.
Interestingly, despite the later argument advanced by the radical textu126
127
128
129

Id. at 408-09 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 410.
506 U.S. 224 (1993).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl.
6 ("The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Im-

peachments.").
130 See Nixon, 506 U.S. at
227-28.
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alists about self-delegation, the Court did not discuss the nondelegation doctrine in this case, even though it would seem relevant
under the theory articulated by Justice Scalia and Professor Manning.
More significantly, Nixon rejects the formalist notion now advocated
by the radical textualists, that there is a constitutional prohibition
against Congress's vesting its committees with considerable legislative power.
In sum, the Supreme Court has stayed reasonably close to its
original analysis of these issues in Ballin for over 100 years, and has
steadfastly refused to judge any rule of the House or Senate dealing
with the enactment process unless another specific constitutional limitation was involved or individual rights were threatened. Though
given many opportunities over the years, as we shall see, it also declined to review a number of other cases from the courts of appeals
that would
have allowed the justices to reevaluate this fundamental
13 1
position.

2. Court ofAppeals Opinions
Over the past thirty years, there have been a number of attempts to
challenge in federal court the validity of particular rules and practices
of the Congress. With the exceptions discussed above, these cases
have not reached the Supreme Court, but have been dealt with by the
courts of appeals. Most have been decided in the D.C. Circuit. These
cases do not form a coherent whole, but viewed together they show
extreme reluctance on the part of the judiciary to intrude into the internal affairs of the Congress because of deference to the powers of a
coordinate branch of government. Since they ordinarily do not involve the rights of persons outside the legislative branch, or violate
other clear constitutional provisions, one would have thought that fidelity to Balin would have made these easy cases. In fact, the doctrinal confusion has been substantial, and three different theories have
been used to avoid decisions that interfere with the rulemaking power
of Congress. The first is standing, a frequently employed ground for
dismissing suits challenging congressional rules and practices, particularly when the plaintiff is a legislator.13 2 The second is the political
131

See, e.g., Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir.

1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985); Crockett v. Regan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
cert. denied,467 U.S. 1251 (1984); VanderJagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert.
denied,464 U.S. 823 (1983); Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm'n, 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981); Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Periodical
Correspondents' Ass'n, 515 F.2d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976).
See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997) (finding that members of Congress
did
not present a sufficient personal stake or concrete injury to challenge the Line Item Veto Act);
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question analysis of Baker v. Carr,133 and more particularly the "textual commitment" prong of that test, which rests solidly on the Rulemaking Clause.134 The third is more general separation of powers
concerns, often expressed by the D.C. Circuit under the rubric of "equitable discretion."' 135 Together, these doctrines have been an effective
barrier to victory for plaintiffs challenging congressional practices.
Judges in the D.C. Circuit have continued to insist that, as a general matter, challenges to congressional rules and practices are justiciable, even in light of Ballin and Baker.136 Despite this provocative
posture, which is probably inconsistent with a proper reading of the
Supreme Court's decisions, the court's actual disposition of cases has
been quite deferential, affirming a broad scope for the rulemaking
power embodied in Article I, Section 5, Clause 2.
In the 1970s, the D.C. Circuit decided several cases dealing with
congressional rules and practices. Consumers Union of the United
States, Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents' Association 37 involved
distribution of press passes to the House and Senate galleries, which
the court had no trouble finding was insulated by the rulemaking

Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 208, 214-15 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding that Representative
Harrington had suffered no cognizable injury by being denied CIA appropriations information).
133 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
134 See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 589 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (affirming
the district court's refusal to grant injunctive or declaratory relief with respect to divulgence to
Congress of trade secrets obtained by the Federal Trade Commission under compulsion of subpoena, and denying a stay pending appeal); Consumers Union, 515 F.2d at 1346 (holding that the
issue was nonjusticiable because it "involves matters committed by the Constitution to the Legislative Department ...").
135 See, e.g., Moore, 733 F.2d at 954-56; Crockett, 720 F.2d
at 1356-57; Riegle, 656 F.2d at
879-82. Riegle was the first case to use the doctrine of circumscribed equitable discretion because, in the words of the D.C. Circuit, it "avoids the problem engendered by the doctrines of
standing, political question, and ripeness." Id. at 881. However, the doctrine of equitable discretion has recently been called into doubt by the D.C. Circuit. For example, in Chenoweth v.
Clinton, 181 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1999), Judge Ginsburg stated that "[t]he practical significance
of Riegle was also open to question" because "with one exception... every decision in which we
applied the doctrine of equitable discretion was either reversed upon another jurisdictional
ground by the Supreme Court, or reached the same result that would have obtained had we
treated separation of powers concerns as part of our inquiry into the plaintiff's standing." Id. at
114-15. Judge Tatel, concurring, disagreed and found that the doctrine of equitable discretion
was still valid and that the majority "read those decisions too broadly." Id. at 118 (Tatel, J.,
concurring).
136 See VanderJagt, 699 F.2d at 1172 ("This circuit has previously
expressed its reluctance
to review congressional rules, though it has never denied its power to do so."). Judge Ginsburg
has stated a similar proposition. See United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 1305 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (claiming that "it is perfectly clear that the Rulemaking clause is not an absolute bar to
judicial interpretation of the House Rules").
137 515 F.2d 1341, 1342-45 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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power of Article I, Section 5. Harringtonv. Bush 138 involved a much
more important matter, the congressional practice of hiding the CIA's
budget in other appropriations, and severely limiting those in Congress
who could look at the relevant numbers. While the judges ultimately
decided that Congressman Harrington had no standing, they stated
clearly that the appropriations process was solely under the control of
the Congress, as were the139practices of the House for allowing access to
CIA budget information.
In the early 1980s, Judge Carl McGowan wrote an influential law
review article in which he argued that the traditional doctrines of
standing, ripeness, and political question were ill-suited to the special
case of members of Congress challenging internal procedures, and that
a better ground was "equitable discretion" based on separation of
powers. 140 Faced with a challenge by members to internal rules or
practices of the House or Senate, urged Judge McGowan, the better
course for a federal court was simply to refrain from deciding the case
out of respect for a coordinate branch of government, while at the
same time maintaining the theoretical power to judge them.'14 The
D.C. Circuit adopted this theory in Riegle v. Federal Open Market
143
Committee 42 in 1981, and used it in a number of cases thereafter.
Moore v. United States House of Representatives'44 is a particularly interesting use of the equitable discretion doctrine, because it
called forth a strong dissenting opinion from then-Circuit Judge
Scalia. The case involved a challenge to a tax statute on the grounds
that it violated the Origination Clause; the panel dismissed it on the
basis of equitable discretion. Judge Scalia condemned the use of that
doctrine to dispose of the case because it involves, in the words of
Judge Bork, "unconfined judicial power to decide or not to decide
cases."' 145 Judge Scalia argued that the Rulemaking Clause created
an area of unfettered congressional decision making; therefore, abstention in cases like these was "the result not of our discretion but of constitutional command."' 146 He argued that federal judges sit "neither to
138 553 F.2d 190, 194-96 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
139 See id. at
214-15.
140 See Hon. Carl McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New
Plaintiffs, 15 GA L. REV.

241, 254-67 (1981). See also Note, CongressionalAccess to the FederalCourts, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 1632 (1977).
141 See McGowan, supra note 140, at 254-67.
142 656 F.2d 873, 879-82 (D.C. Cit. 1981).
143 See supra note 135.
144733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
145Id. at 959 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
146

Id. at 957.
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supervise the internal workings of the executive and legislative
branches nor to umpire disputes between those branches regarding
their respective powers."' 47 Unless the action of the Congress harmed
rights of those outside the legislative branch, "it is not part of our constitutional province,"' 48 he argued, to decide the case. Asserting the
power to use its equitable judgment as to whether to intervene in a
particular dispute revolving around congressional rules or practices,
said Judge Scalia, "would not be to decide a judicial controversy, but
to assume a position of authority over the governmental act of another
and co-equal
department, an authority which plainly we do not pos14 9
sess."'
I would suggest that Judge Scalia's observations in Moore, echoed
more recently by Justice Scalia in Munoz-Flores, strongly support the
thesis of this Article-that the congressional reliance on an authoritative committee system is delegated to it by the Constitution. They
seem inconsistent with the radical textualist position denigrating the
committee system and denying any weight to committee reports in the
process of arriving at statutory meaning.
A particularly helpful opinion appearing during this period of doctrinal debate in the D.C. Circuit was written by Judge Abner Mikva in
Gregg v. Barrett.150 The case involved a challenge to the lax practices
of the Congress in printing the Congressional Record; the plaintiff
argued that it must be an accurate record of the floor proceedings.
Reviewing the entire area of the law and his circuit's contributions to
it, former Congressman Mikva concluded with regard to congressional
plaintiffs that "our analysis precludes this D.C. Circuit from reviewing
congressional practices and procedures when they primarily and directly affect the way Congress does its legislative business. '1 5' Relying both on the principle of equitable discretion and on more general
notions of separation of powers, Judge Mikva argued that how accurately the Record reflected the actual proceedings is for Congress to
decide. "[O]ur deference and esteem for the institution as a whole and
for the constitutional command that the institution be allowed to manprecludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of
age its own affairs
152
the problem."

147

48
149
150
151
152

/d.at 959.

Id. at 959.
Id. at 964.
771 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
Id. at 541-42.
Id. at 549.
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Several cases in the 1980s and 1990s relate more directly to the
principal arguments being made in this Article, namely the power of
Congress to make rules governing the enactment process and to give
authoritative weight to its committee system.
Metzenbaum v. FERC153 involved the interesting question whether
Congress could waive or ignore certain parliamentary rules for amending a particular statute that had been enacted with the statute. 154 Congressional plaintiffs asked the judges to decide whether the second
legislative action was invalid because Congress had violated its own
rules. The Court decided that the two houses had retained complete
control over their own rules, even in cases where Congress had written
them into a duly enacted statute.155 Resting on the Rulemaking
Clause, the court went on to note that the question whether either
chamber had followed its own rules was a non-justiciable political
question, and that the validity of the law in question turned solely on
whether the minimal requirements spelled
out in the Constitution were
156
were).
clearly
they
(which
observed
Vander Jagt v. O'NeiI157 is one of the few federal cases specifically involving the committee system. Disgruntled House Republicans challenged the allocation of committee seats, arguing that they
should receive representation on committees roughly proportional to
their membership in the House itself. The D.C. Circuit judges, with
Judge Bork strongly objecting, 158 decided that the doctrine of equitable discretion precluded entry into that particular political thicket, specifically disclaiming reliance on standing or political question doctrines.15 9 Again, though it seems inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's teachings in Ballin, the judges asserted their power to deter153 675 F.2d 1282 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
154 See id. at
1287.
155 See id. (discussing the need for courts to refrain from getting involved in every dispute

over the content of a House or Senate rule).
156

157 699 F.2d. 1166 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
158

See id. at 1179 (Bork, J., concurring) (arguing that the case should have been dismissed

on standing grounds). Specifically, he contended that this was a case of a "generalized grievance" and not of specific harm to the plaintiffs. Justice Powell in United States v. Richardson,
418 U.S. 166 (1974), noted that "public confidence essential to the former [representativeness of
the legislators] and the vitality critical to the latter [life-tenured judges] may well erode if we do
not exercise self-restraint in the utilization of our power to negative the actions of other
branches." Id.
159See id. at 1168 ("We hold that this case should be dismissed using Riegle's approach
of
withholding relief where prudential and separation-of-powers concerns counsel us not to exercise
our judicial power. We do not think that the Speech or Debate Clause immunities are necessarily
applicable in this context, nor do we think that we lack jurisdiction because of Article I. We also
find that appellants do have standing.").
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mine the validity of congressional rules in general: "This circuit has
previously expressed its reluctance to review congressional operating
rules, though it has never denied its power to do so.'' 6° Senior District
Judge James F. Gordon, sitting by designation, construed Ballin to
command only that judges must not tell Congress what rule it must
adopt, not that it must refrain from judging rules at all (except in the
specific types of cases noted there).
Michel v. Anderson' 6' challenged the decision by the House majority to allow the four delegates from the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, the Virgin Islands, and American Samoa to vote in the Committee of the Whole, with the proviso that if their votes made a difference
in the outcome, there would have to be a second vote without their
participation.162 Noting that the Committee of the Whole functions in
many respects as a surrogate for the House of Representatives itself,
the court of appeals nonetheless held that the Committee was a creature of House rules, and they were within the power of the House to
adopt. It argued that the House's action stopped just short of giving
the delegates actual membership in the House, which would violate
the specific commands of the Constitution on the makeup of that
body. 163 It also acknowledged that the delegates had been given votes
in standing committees, even on reporting bills, for many years, and
held that practice also within the power of the House under the Rulemaking Clause. 164 Michel therefore goes very far in the direction of
supporting an extensive congressional power over the committee
process, allowing the House to do something that seems intuitively
outside the bounds of the Framers' concept of the federal legislature.
Even more strongly supporting the broad discretion of the House
and Senate over the enactment process is the most recent in this line of
cases, Skaggs v. Carle.165 Skaggs involved the decision of the "new"
Republican House after the 1994 election to impose a three-fifths voting requirement on measures that raised income tax rates. Despite the
plaintiff members' arguments that they had suffered vote dilution, the
D.C. Circuit ruled that they had suffered no injury, and therefore had
no standing. 166 Analyzing the House rules in some detail, the court
reasoned that a determined majority could change the three-fifths
160

161
162
163

Id. at 1172-73.

14 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
Id. at 624-25.
Id. at 630-32.

Id. at 624-25, 630-32.
110 F.3d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
166 Id. at 833-37.

164

165
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rule. 167 The judges avoided discussing the profound issue of the place

of majority rule in the Constitution, which had been loudly and publicly debated by scholars, 15 to rest on a narrower ground that allowed
the House to manage the enactment process in any way it chose.
Only a few relevant cases have been decided outside of the D.C.
Circuit on these issues. The most interesting for our purposes is
Mester Manufacturing Co. v. INS, 169 which involved the question of
whether the House and Senate could delegate to a committee or to an
officer the power to present a passed bill to the President for signature
after adjourning. Even though specific language in Article I, Section 7
is involved in this instance, the court found that this practice fell
within Congress's discretion to manage its affairs. Citing the Seventh
Circuit case of United States v. Kapsais,170 the Ninth Circuit concluded that "the ministerial acts of examination, enrollment, and presentment may unquestionably be delegated by Congress to its leadership, or to a standing committee, and these delegated acts may be performed even when Congress stands adjourned sine die., 171 Citing the
Rulemaking Clause, Judge Beezer noted that "[i]n the absence of express constitutional direction, we defer to the reasonable procedures
Congress has ordained for its internal business.... The Constitution
also requires extreme deference to accompany any judicial inquiry
into the internal governance of Congress.'' 7 2
167 See id. at 835 (indicating that on at least four occasions
during the 104th Congress, the
House voted to waive the 3/5 rule in order to allow a simple majority to enact legislation that
increased income tax rates).
168 There are many articles and student comments on the issue;
however, two pieces in
particular stand out. See Comment, An Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, 104 YALE L.
1539 (1995) (arguing that the supermajority rule is unconstitutional). The open letter was signed
by seventeen distinguished law professors. But see John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport,
The Constitutionalityof Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE LJ. 483
(1995) (arguing that the supermajority rule is wholly constitutional and in fact does not prevent a
majority from enacting legislation through some procedural maneuvering). It would appear that
Professors McGinnis & Rappaport have the better of the argument; then-Judge Ruth Bader
Ginsburg essentially agreed with their conclusion that the supermajority rule did not prevent a
majority from working its will upon the Congress. See Skaggs, 110 F.3d at 835-36. For a further
discussion of the constitutionality and utility of the supermajority rule by scholars and students,
see also Neals-Erik William Delker, The House Three-Fifths Tax Rule: Majority Rule, the Framers' Intent, and the Judiciary'sRole, 100 DICK. L. REv. 341 (1996); Brett W. King, Deconstructing Gordon and Contingent Legislative Authority: The Constitutionalityof Supermajority Rules,
6 U. CHL L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 133 (1999); Robert S. Leach, Comment, House Rule XX and an
Argument Against a Constitutional Requirement for Majority Rule in Congress, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 1253 (1997); Jed Rubenfeld, Essay,-Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in Congress, 1996
DUKE LJ. 73.
169 879 F.2d 561,570-71 (9th Cir. 1989).
170 214 F.2d 677, 679-83 (7th Cir. 1954).
171
172

Mester, 879 F.2d at 571.
Id.
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D. Summary
What can be said, then, about the breadth of the Rulemaking
Clause based on judicial explorations of the issue? Certainly the federal courts have not interpreted Chadha and Bowsher as justification
for telling the Congress that it may not delegate broad power to its
committees, as Justice Scalia and Professor Manning would seem to
advocate. To the contrary, one would have to conclude from the case
law that Congress's rulemaking power is far-reaching, and that absent
the violation of a personal right of a non-legislator or another specific
constitutional limitation, courts feel obliged to affirm any congressional rule or practice that involves the enactment process itself.
These cases provide a clear basis for deferring to the congressional
practice of explaining the meaning and background of its enactments
in committee reports and for recognizing those reports as authoritative.
If a legislative chamber can allow non-members to vote in its standing
committees and even in the Committee of the Whole House, if it can
use a committee to hear trial evidence in impeachment cases, if it can
reduce the voting effectiveness of minority members in committee, if
it can adopt generous interpretations of the quorum rules, if it can keep
members in the dark about aspects of the appropriations process, if it
can delegate to a committee the function of presenting an enrolled bill
to the President during a congressional recess, or if it can adopt supermajority rules to govern certain internal voting processes, then surely
it can use standing committees and conference committees to amplify
the meaning of ambiguous provisions and provide background principles that illuminate its legislative objectives.
VI. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF AN AUTHORITATIVE

COMM1TIEE PROCESS
If, as I have argued, the Rulemaking Clause of Article I, Section 5
of the Constitution gives Congress the power to create committees as
part of the enactment process, and if Congress also has the power to
utilize the products of that system, namely committee reports, to elucidate the bare words of its laws, we must still ask whether Congress
has in fact made such a delegation. 73 I must acknowledge, of course,
that Congress has not adopted rules explicitly providing that commit173 As already noted in the discussion of non-delegation,
infra, we are not now talking about
the delegation of legislative power to agencies or the President under the traditional nondelegation doctrine, but rather about internal delegation of tasks within the legislative branch.
Such internal delegation is common and should be non-controversial. Courts have long held that
the President can delegate his powers to others in the executive branch, and of course judges can
delegate aspects of their power to special masters.
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tee reports are authoritative explanations of later enacted laws, though
in the case of conference reports they come very close to doing so.
Such an explicit delegation to standing committees would buttress my
analysis, but would probably seem unnecessary and redundant to veteran legislators. The reality of this delegation to the committee system
emerges from the history of the House and Senate, from an institutional analysis of the enactment process itself, and from an understanding of the formal rules of the two chambers. Through such an
analysis, we can see the wrongheadedness of Justice Scalia's basic
contention that the formal products of the committee system lack constitutional legitimacy in determining the meaning of an ambiguous
statute.
A. History of the Committee System
The radical textualist view of the congressional committee-both
distrustful and disrespectful-must seem peculiar to the many political
scientists who have devoted their careers to studying the committee
system. It is all the more peculiar to anyone who has spent a substantial period working inside any large legislative body, for it remains
true, as Woodrow Wilson observed so many years ago, that "Congress
in its committee-rooms is Congress at work."' 174 They are, in the
words of one legislator, the "heart and soul" of the Congress.' 75 Their
work cannot be ignored by anyone wishing to understand either the
legislative process as a whole or a specific piece of legislation.
The history of representative legislative bodies establishes without
doubt that committees are a routine feature of all such groups. Senator
Robert Byrd in his history of the Senate traces the first use of legisla176
tive committees to the English Parliament in the fourteenth century.
Professor Ralph Harlow's classic study dates standing committees 1in
77
the modern sense to the close of the sixteenth century in Parliament.
In any case, the American colonists were well aware of the role of
committees in studying and debating policy alternatives, and indeed in
drafting legislation. Most colonial legislatures had some standing
committees and many select committees, and they were especially
174 WOODROW WILSON,

CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 69 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press

1981) (1885).
175 HISTORY OF THE UNIIED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
H.R. Doc. No. 103-

324, at 143 (1994) [hereinafter US HOUSE HISTORY] (quoting Representative Dave Martin of
Nebraska). While not a scholarly study, this informal history, prepared by the Congressional
Research Service ("CRS"), contains much useful information about the House and its traditions.
176 2 BYRD, supra note 96, at 207-08 (1988).
177 See RALPH VOLNEY HARLOW, THE HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE
METHODS IN THE PERIOD

BEFORE 1825, at 3-7 (1917).
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vigorous and important in North Carolina and Virginia. 178 Committees continued to play an important role in the revolutionary period,
and subcommittees even made their appearance in North Carolina and
Virginia after 1776.179 Indeed, the Declaration of Independence was
drafted by a Select Committee of the Continental Congress, composed
of Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Roger
Sherman, and Robert Livingston. 180 In the time-honored tradition of
all committees, one member-Jefferson-did most of the work.
When the Framers gathered in Philadelphia to consider changes to
the Articles of Confederation in 1787, one of their first acts was to
adopt rules of proceeding; the rules were drafted and presented by a
committee, of course.1 8 They provided that committees of the
Convention could be appointed by a vote of those present. 18 2 As the
Framers worked toward creating a new and enduring system of federal
government that summer, they made heavy use of committees to propose alternatives on crucial issues and to draft constitutional provisions. 183 A committee carried out the task of refining the final language for adoption by the states' representatives,
and eventual presen84
tation to the states themselves for ratification.
It is not surprising then that the first Congress, which included
many members of the Philadelphia Convention, interpreted its rulemaking power under Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution to allow
the formation of select and standing committees. Particularly in the
House, they were viewed as indispensable components of the enactment process. As one history of the House puts it:

178 See id. at 11-21, 75-78, 106-11, app. (Lists of
Standing Committees) (discussing that
Virginia had a clear idea of the value of the standing committee and was adapting the institution
to local needs).
Id. at75, 110-11.
180 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION

1986).

546 (Leonard W. Levy et al. ed.,

See PRESCOTT, supra note 101, at 37-42; 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION,
supra note 101, at 9 (the rules provided that various committees could "be appointed by ballot;
and that the members who have the greatest number of ballots... be the Committee").
182 See PRESCOTT, supra note 101, at 42-45. The main committees
in the Constitutional
Convention were the Committee of Detail and the Committee on Style and Arrangement. Id.
See also 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 101, at 129 (Committee of
Detail), 565 (Committee on Style and Arrangement).
183 See supra note
182.
184 See PRESCOTT, supra note 101, at 42-45 (stating
that "this able Committee on Style and
Arrangement nevertheless gave to that document its most enduring qualities-its conciseness, its
adaptability, its flexibility, and withal its stability"); 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION,
supra note 101, at 129-74 (describing the activities of the Committee of Detail), 565-90 (describing the activities of the Committee on Style and Arrangement).
181
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The Constitution was silent on the organization and structure of the House beyond saying that it should choose its
Speaker and other officers, determine the rules of its proceedings, and keep and publish a journal of its business. Once a
quorum appeared, the House lost little time in organizing itself
in four steps: election of officers, adoption of rules, appoint185
ment of committees, and the acceptance of credentials.
One of the first bills passed by the Congress, H.R. 15 (introduced on
July 22, 1789), required a conference committee to iron out differences between the House and Senate versions. 186 Published committee reports, which often included explanation and background discussion on reported bills, made their appearance very early. 187 To be

sure, the role of early committees was limitedas compared to modern
practice, as was the legislative business of the House itself. But by
1810, the House had ten standing committees, each covering a distinct
policy area, as well as other select committees. 88 Written committee

reports performing much the same function as they do today were
quite common from the beginning. 189 The Senate's history is similar,
though it has always relied less on the committee system in processing
and drafting the final form of legislation. 190
The role of committees in the enactment process and their specific
powers were set out in House and Senate rules over the years in varying degrees of detail. Committees increased in number and impor185 US HOUSE HISTORY, supra note 175,
at 13, 171-73. See also 1 RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 101, at 1-10.
186 See An Act for Allowing a Compensation to the
President and Vice President of the
United States, ch. 19, sec. 1, 1 Stat. 72 (1789). The Senate insisted on certain amendments
proposed in a committee report delivered by Morrison on August 7, 1789.
See IV
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-1791 480-85 (Charlene
Bangs Bickford and Helen E. Veit, eds., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press rev. ed. 1986). On Segtember 8', the House voted to disagree with the Senate amendments. Also on September 8 , the
Senate appointed a conference committee consisting of King, Izard, and Morris. On September
9', the House appointed Baldwin, Livermore and Goodhue to its conference committee. The
conference committee met on September 17"', but failed to reach agreement. The Senate receded
from its amendment on September 21", and the bill was passed by both houses and signed by the
President on September 24, 1789. Id.
Interestingly enough, a conference committee was also necessary to resolve House and
Senate differences regarding the text of the Bill of Rights. An agreement was reached in conference, and a committee report was issued on September 24, 1789, altering the language of what
was then the 5J and 14 amendments, but which became the 1" and 6"' amendments. Id. at 1-48.
See US HOUSE HISTORY, supranote 175,
at 144.
18s Id.
189 See generally IV DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-

1791, supra note 186.
190 See 2 BYRD, supra note 96, at 207-65. See also STEVEN J.
SMITH & CHRISTOPHER J.
DEERING, COMMTrIEES IN CONGRESS 23-56 (2d ed. 1990).
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tance as the work of the Congress became more complex and more
contentious in the nineteenth century. The amount of control over
legislation ceded by the majority to its committee system varied over
time, and was the subject of several waves of "reform." The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 put committees on a statutory base
for the first time, and introduced many of the institutions of the modern Congress. 191 Committee power probably reached its highest point
in the 1950s and slowly declined until the major reforms of the
1970s.192 These reforms were designed to break the power of conservative southern Democrats who had dominated Congress through the
seniority system and had blocked important legislation. There has
followed since a diffusion of committee power, a rise in the importance of subcommittees, and a reassertion of the importance of floor
action in the enactment process. 193
This brief history makes it clear that committees have always been
seen as a natural and absolutely crucial element of the enactment
process in any legislative body. In the U.S. Congress, their authority
rests on three bases-the Rulemaking Clause in Article I of the Constitution, rules adopted by each chamber, and statutes. They are indeed an integral part of that "finely wrought" process of creating laws
in Article I that was alluded to by the Chadha majority. 194 Whether
they are relatively more powerful or less so as compared with the floor
majority, whether they mirror the policy preferences of the larger body
they represent or not, is not legally or constitutionally significant.
While Justice Scalia places emphasis on such arguments in asserting
the radical textualist position that committee reports should be ignored, it is the thesis of this Article that such arguments are interesting
but ultimately irrelevant. Whether committees are more or less pow191

The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 (1946).

Several provisions in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 note that each house of Congress has the power to unilaterally repeal or amend any rule contained in the Act. See id. at 60
Stat 814 ("The following sections of this title are enacted by the Congress... [w]ith the full
recognition of the constitutional right of either House to changes such rules... at any time...
."). See also The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-510, 84 Stat. 1140,
1143 (stating the same proposition as the 1946 Act). Cf. Metzenbaum v. FERC, 675 F.2d 1282,
1286-89 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (stating that "[tlo invalidate Pub. L. No. 97-93 on the ground that it
was enacted in violation of House rules would be to declare as erroneous the understanding of
the House of Representatives of rules of its own making, binding upon it only by its own
choice").
192 See BURDErT A. LOOMIS, THE CONTEMPORARY CONGRESS
27-32 (2d ed. 1998);
WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 107-09 (4th ed.
1996); STEVEN J. SMITH, CALL TO ORDER: FLOOR POLITICS IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE 1-14
(1989); SMrH & DEERING, supra note 190, at 23-56.
193 See LOOMIS, supra note 192, at 27-32; SMITH, supra note

192, at 1-14; SMITH &

DEERING, supra note 190, at 119-62.
194 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).

2001]

ARE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES CONSTITUTIONAL?

547

erful or representative is entirely within the control of a majority of the
chamber concerned, and the majority's institutional choices are made
under the authority of the Rulemaking Clause. They therefore must
not be questioned, but rather accepted
by the judiciary in trying to
95
interpret Congress's handiwork.1
Before leaving the question of the legal foundation for committees, it is well to say a word about the special place of conference
committees. As noted above, conference committees have existed
from the beginning of the Congress. Most observers familiar with the
enactment process instinctively realize that conference committee
actions and their accompanying written statements are the most authoritative possible explanations of the meaning and purpose of legislation. 196 This is because they occur at the last stage of that process,
and their comments explain the final form of the language. What is
less often commented upon is that conference committees may well
have an even stronger constitutional basis than standing committees.
This is because they are an important element of the constitutional
concept of bicameralism that the Supreme Court, and particularly the
radical textualists, have increasingly emphasized in recent years.
Since, as the Court has pointed out in Chadhaand other cases, legislation must pass both houses in identical form in order to be presented to
the President under the familiar Article I procedures, the conference
committee is often a vital part of the process. While it is sometimes
possible to reconcile differences between the chambers by amendment
and thus to avoid a conference, this is rarely the case for important
legislation. 197 It is usually the conference committee, a quintessential
195 Several critics of the textualists' attitude toward committee materials have commented

on the lack of respect for Congress inherent in it. Judge Wald, for example, has said that "[1]f we
are serious about respecting the will of Congress, how can we ignore Congress' chosen methods
for expressing that will?... To disregard committee reports as indicators of congressional understanding ... is to second-guess Congress' chosen form of organization and delegation of
authority, and to doubt its ability to oversee its own constitutional functions effectively. It comes
perilously close, in my view, to impugning the way a coordinate branch conducts its operations
and, in that sense, runs the risk of violating the spirit if not the letter of the separation of powers
principle." Wald, supra note 1, at 306-07.
For an insightful analysis of the authoritativeness and usefulness of the various kinds of
legislative history by a scholar close to the Congress, see George A. Costello, Average Voting
Members and Other "Benign Fictions:" The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor
Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 41-42. See
also OLESZEK, supra note 192, at 272,289-94 ("The conference committee... is one of the most
critical points in the legislative process."); SMrrIH & DEERING, supra note 190, at 191 (discussing
the important role of conference committees).
See OLESZEK, supra note 192, at 274 ("It is often clear from the
outset that controversial
measures will end up in conference."); CHARLES MIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: A REFERENCE, RESEARCH, AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE 767-847 (1989) (exploring

the use of the conference as the most important means to enact contentious legislation); Charles
Tiefer, The Reconceptualizationof Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000 Wis. L. REV.
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bicameral body, that carries out the crucial constitutional function of
preparing from the disparate House and Senate bills one final set of
legislative provisions for final passage. 198 Other aspects of the conference function should also lead even the radical textualist to consider
its product authoritative, and rebut some of the textualist critique of
standing committees' work. Normally, each house adopts a resolution
explicitly authorizing the conference and empowering the Speaker or
Majority Leader to appoint conferees.1 99 Conference committees, particularly in the House, are sometimes instructed on how to vote on
certain possible compromises, putting strong institutional pressure on
conferees and giving their final actions a much more authoritative
flavor.20 0 Sometimes a chamber appoints specific individuals as conferees for specific bill provisions, making the agency relationship even
clearer. 20 1 Explanatory language in the accompanying statement of
managers represents the joint work of House and Senate staffs and
members, and is subject to closer scrutiny than normal standing committee reports. 202 In practice, statements of the managers of bills in
conference are much more carefully considered by legislators in
deciding whether to vote for the final compromise product.20 3 They
represent an indispensable record of the detailed bicameral "deal" on
the legislation.20 4
In short, conference committees rest on an even stronger constitutional base than standing committees, and overcome many of the
shortcomings of process that lead the radical textualists to ignore the
product of committee work. For these reasons, statements by conference managers about the meaning of specific bill provisions should be

205, 232 (stating that "what the conference committees do dominates the law").
198 See OLESZEK, supra note 192, at 274-94;
SMITH & DEERING, supra note 190, at 191-99;
TIEFER, supra note 197, at 767-847; Tiefer, supra note 197, at 233-35.
See OLESZEK, supra note 192, at 278-80; SMITH & DEERING,
supra note 190, at 193-94;
TIEFER, supra note 197, at 767-847.
200 See OLESZEK, supra note 192, at 282-83; SMrrH
& DEERING, supra note 190, at 196-98;
TIEFER, supra note 197, at 767-847.
201 See OLESZEK, supra note 192, at 278-81;
SMrrH & DEERING, supra note 190, at 195;
TIEFER, supra note 197, at 791-847.
202 See OLESZEK, supranote 192, at 289-94.
See also SMITH & DEERING, supra note 190, at
198; TIEFER, supra note 197, at 825-834; Tiefer, supra note 197, at 237-40, 268-69 (noting the
influence of reports on the Supreme Court's decision making).
203 See generally OLESZEK, supra note 192, at
289-94; SMITH & DEERING, supra note 190,
at 198-99.
204 Professor Tiefer has pointed out
to me that the U.S. Code Congressional and
Administrative News ("U.S.C.C.A.N."), the closest thing we have to official legislative history,
always prints conference statements of managers, even though it sometimes omits one or both
standing committee reports.
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taken as authoritative even by the most hide-bound textualist. In all of
the vast writing about legislative history, the enactment process, and
the appropriateness of considering committee reports, this important
distinction has not been adequately stressed.
B. Committees and the InstitutionalCulture of Congress
Anyone who has observed or served on a legislative body of even
the most routine sort understands why committees are indispensable.
The House's own informal history sums it up well:
Committees, created to process the workload of a legislature, are where Congress gathers information; compares and
evaluates legislative alternatives; identifies policy problems
and proposes solutions; selects, revises, and reports out measures for the full chamber to consider; monitors the executive
of its duties; and investigates allegabranch's performance
2 5
tions of wrongdoing. 0
Our focus, of course, is on the second and third of these broad functions-the open-ended consideration of problems facing the country
and possible approaches to solving them, and the process of drafting
specific bills and bringing them to the floor. Political scientists and
historians who have considered the operation of congressional committees stress particularly that the committee system enables the larger
body to develop and draw on specialized expertise, allowing members
who cannot otherwise become expert on each complex piece of pending legislation to rely on the advice of others who have worked on the
relevant committee.20 By concentrating expert staff resources in the
committees over the long term, Congress creates a repository of
knowledge for all members to draw upon.
Professor Burdett Loomis, in his recent examination of the modern Congress, sums up the institutional culture well. After recounting
the ebbs and flows of committee power over the history of the national
legislature, he notes that:
[C]ommittees remain important and powerful because their
existence makes such good sense, both for individual legislaSee US HOUSE HISTORY, supra note 175, at 143.
See LOOMIS, supra note 192, at 82 ("In short, committees and subcommittees can and do
serve Congress as a whole by providing specialized information to the chamber at large.");
OLESZEK, supra note 192, at 187-88 (stating that "[ilt is nearly impossible for a member to be
fully informed on every issue before the House"); SMITH & DEERING, supra note 190, at 225-28
("Committees provide the division of labor required to handle a large and complex work load.").
2W
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tors and for the Congress as a whole. Acting on their own,
435 House members and 100 Senators cannot reasonably be
expected to hammer out coherent legislation across the entire
spectrum of issues on each year's congressional agenda....

... [C]ongressional decentralization through the committee
system allows lawmakers to specialize and make informed decisions on a wide range of complex, often conflicting proposals. In fact, by sharing information across committees, Congress as a whole may produce a relatively coherent, consistent
set of policies.2 °7

To be sure, critics of the legislative process have argued that this
picture is unrealistic, and that committees have often been unrepresentative of their parent body 20 8 and obstructionist on key issues such as
civil rights. As I have noted, the short answer to such arguments is
that, as Professor Loomis notes, "[m]embers construct the kind of
committee system they want;" they can and do change it when it does
not suit their overall interests.7 9 More recent empirical scholarship on
the committee system suggests, moreover, that committees are in fact
reasonably representative. Kiewiet and McCubbins' study shows that
the majority does a good job over time of controlling the national pol210
icy agenda by managing the power that it delegates to committees.
They find that capture by special interests is most likely to happen on
the least important committees; leadership ensures that members on its
most important committees, like Budget and Appropriations, mirror
the views of the floor majority.2 1 I Even that cornerstone argument of
Public Choice theorists-that legislators seek out committees that allow them to maximize their interest group support and therefore their
chances of reelection-has been powerfully challenged by the work of
2W7

LOOMIS, supra note 192, at 79-80.
The classic work arguing that committees are unrepresentative
of the parent chamber
and that members seek committee assignments to represent special interests and thus ensure their
reelection is KENNETH A. SHEPSLE, THE GIANT JIGSAW PUZZLE: DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE
ASSIGNMENT IN THE MODERN HOUSE (1978). This view is disputed in KEITH KREHBIEL,
INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION (1991). The debate is reviewed in Richard L.
2W

Hall & Bernard Grofman, Process and the Conditional Nature of Committee Power, 84 AM.
POL. SCL REV. 1149 (1990).
209 LOOMIS, supranote
192, at 83.
210 D. RODERICK KIEWIE & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS,
THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION: CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 43-55, 92-133 (1991).
211

Id. at 100-10.
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2 12
Krehbiel's emsuch scholars as Keith Krehbiel and Richard Hall.
pirical work establishes that other motivations, such as a desire to support the President's program and to work toward favored policy goals,
are more important motivators of both committee preferences and
members' behavior on committees than selfish pursuit of contributions
and political survival.213
In any case, it is an empirical fact that committees dominate the
enactment process in both the House and Senate. The system that
Congress has created under the Rulemaking Clause means that it is
extremely unlikely for any significant measure not reported by a committee to ultimately be passed, and that most legislation emerges from
each chamber roughly in the form reported by the standing committee
that worked on it.214 Again, scholars such as Smith and Deering
demonstrate that these truths endure despite fluctuations in the
relationship between committees and floor action over time.215
Heavy reliance on the committee system is a particular feature of
the House of Representatives. Because of its large size, the House
must limit floor debate and amendments to bills if it is to pass any
legislation at all. As we shall see, its rules particularly favor committees, and in recent decades, specialized subcommittees. Moreover, the
House has placed enormous power in the hands of its Rules Committee, which dominates the floor agenda in a way not possible in the
Senate.
Because of this institutional structure, the ordinarily legislative
work of a member centers around her committees, and very often one
committee where she develops special expertise. Professor Hall's
empirical study of participation by members in the legislative process
provides a convincing picture of the degree to which the majority relies on its committees.
He found that members rely on committee
and subcommittee leaders to a surprising degree in the enactment
process. For example, about sixty percent of committee members vote
on final passage of a bill in committee, but only forty percent participate in the markup debate, less than twenty percent are actively in-

212

See RICHARD HALL, PARTICIPATION IN CONGRESS 49-85 (1996) (arguing that the

"[m]ember-as-reelection-seeker" hypothesis is an insufficient basis on which to analyze congressional member participation); KREHBIEL, supra note 208, at 247-90 (arguing that a growing body
of evidence points away from distributive theories of congressional participation).
213 See HAIL, supra note 212, at 72-74, 194-95, 210-11; KREHBIEL, supra note 208, at 6668.

214 See, e.g., SHEPSLE, supra note 208, at 9; SMITH, supra
note 192, at 170-96, 240-42;
SMITH & DEERING, supranote 190, at 9-14, 179-89, 216-17.
215 See SMITH & DEERING, supranote 190, at 1-19, 213-17.
216 See HALL, supranote 212, at 32-74, 175-214.
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volved in the amending process in committee, and about twenty-five
percent are involved in behind-the-scenes negotiations on the bill's
provisions.2 17 Those included in the percentages will vary with different bills, indicating that members concentrate their work on legislative
items important to them or on which they have developed expertise.
Likewise on the floor, only about fifteen percent of all members did
anything other than casting their votes in the bill sample studied by
Hall. Less than five percent offered amendments. 18 Those figures
were much higher for committee and subcommittee members, and
even higher for committee and subcommittee chairs representing the
reporting committee. About fifty percent of the amendment activity
on the floor came from members of the reporting committee. 19
While the textualist viewing the enactment process from afar
might see in such statistics evidence of the grossly undemocratic nature of Congress, the student of the legislative process sees evi'dence
of the necessary specialization by members, and a willingness to cede
the leading role in developing legislation to a carefully constructed
and controlled committee process. It is quite true, as cynics often
point out, that most members do not understand the details of most
bills they vote on. This is not a result of ignorance or sloth, however,
but a manifestation of the overwhelming breadth and complexity of
Congress's work. It was not surprising, then, when John Kingdon, in
his landmark study of congressional voting behavior, heard from
members that they relied most heavily on their staffs and on other legislators who were members of the reporting committee for advice on
whether to support a particular bill. 2
The printed committee report is an essential part of the process by
which committees consider both new legislation and revisions to enacted laws. Reports have many functions, but most importantly for
our purposes they "describe the purposes and scope of the bill, explain
the committee revisions, [and] note proposed changes in existing
law., 22 1 While scholars have not focused on the mechanics of report
writing, all students of the Congress recognize the centrality of printed
committee reports, as the most important means of setting out the
committee's views on the purposes, background, and meaning of
statutory text. 22 As Charles Tiefer has observed, the committee report
217

Id. at 32-47.

218

Id. at 175-81.

219

Id. at 181-84.

220

JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS 86-88, 230-32
(3d ed. 1989).

221

2

OLESZEK, supranote 192, at 119.
LOOMIS, supranote 192, at 82.
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is in fact "more intelligible than the bill itself," recognizing that bill
language is often highly complex and specialized.2 3
Thus, an examination of the unique culture of Congress supports
and strengthens the argument that members intend their committee
system to play a vital role in the enactment process under the Rulemaking Clause of the Constitution, and that in practice they rely on the
committee process almost completely in developing, drafting, and
managing proposed legislation. In the real world, moreover, members
rely on committee reports to help explain their legislative product to
their colleagues, to future congresses, to administrative agencies, and
to judges. In their eyes, it is just as important a part of the enactment
process as legally binding final floor action.
C. A Comment Comparing Committee Process andFloorAction
Now that we have taken a more careful look at the place of committees in Congress, it may be appropriate to return to one of the textualists' most important arguments against the use of legislative history. As we have seen in Part II, Justice Scalia and Professor Manning
reflect in their opposition to legislative history an antipathy toward the
committee process that is rooted in Public Choice and Social Choice
thinking. They speak of voting on the floor of the House and Senate
with almost mystic reverence, but view the activities of committees
with a mixture of horror and disdain. I have argued that Congress
could constitutionally go much further than it has in relying on committees to pass legislation, and indeed could come close to dispensing
with floor action altogether. Justice Scalia would see this as a perversion of the democratic process, but a careful consideration of the committee process in comparison with floor debate would show that
committee consideration is in many ways more in line with our overriding democratic values.
Legislation may pass on the floor with little or no debate, and
what debate there is can be carefully controlled by the leadership. The
general quality of floor speeches on legislation can be lamentably low,
and members sometimes state key issues incorrectly.224 Crucial votes
may not be recorded and amendments can be hastily drawn and misunderstood. Committees, at least on important legislation, hold open
hearings that the press and public can attend, and subject witnesses to
TEFER, supranote 197, at 180.
Such was apparently the case when a resolution disapproving suspension of
deportation
came to the floor of the House in a situation similar to that in Chadha,as noted by the Court in
that opinion. Their members seemed hopelessly confused about the effect of the legislative veto.
See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, at 927 n.3 (1996).
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on-the-record questioning. Committees usually debate and mark up
bills in open session and must record their important votes for all to
see. They employ both expert policy staff and non-partisan professional drafting experts. Like floor deliberation, committee consideration is subject to pressures from the executive branch and from outside
interest groups, but committees publish written "opinions" explaining
in detail what the bill does and why. These opinions, in the form of
pre-enactment committee reports, often contain additional and dissenting views, they explain how existing laws will be affected, and they
provide valuable historical perspective.
Committee processes, then, are actually more open and more deliberative than floor consideration of a bill. It is therefore no accident
that the Supreme Court has on several occasions in recent years taken
a dim view of particular statutory provisions that were written on the
floor without the usual full committee hearings, analysis, and drafting.
The Court too understands that legislating on the floor of the House or
the Senate can be a very ugly process indeed. The most recent example is the Communications Decency Act, inserted at the last minute in
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, despite being poorly thoughtout and egregiously drafted. 2 5
When Professor Manning argues, then, that the use of legislative
history encourages members to be irresponsible and is undemocratic,
he is well wide of the mark. I would argue, contrary to the thrust of
the textualist view of Congress, that with the single exception that the
floor process results in the constitutionally required vote of members,
there is hardly a single aspect of it that is not inferior to the committee
process in terms of our democratic values of good judgment, deliberation, and openness.

225 Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844 (1997) made the point
that the Communications Decency Act was poorly drafted, vague, and confusing, and suggested
that this may be because it had not been considered by committee:
The Act includes seven Titles, six of which are the product of extensive committee hearings and the subject of discussion in Reports prepared by Committees of the Senate and the
House of Representatives. By contrast, Title V-known as the 'Communications Decency
Act of 1996' (CDA)-contains provisions that were either added in executive committee
after the hearings were concluded or as amendments offered during floor debate on the legislation. An amendment offered in the Senate was the source of the two statutory provisions challenged in this case.
Id. at 858.
The Court goes on to note that members in both houses complained on the floor that this
important legislation had not been carefully considered. The same point was made regarding
another part of the bill, relating to indecency on cable systems, in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 822 (2000) (stating that "[s]ection 505 was added to the Act
by floor amendment, accompanied by only brief statements, and without committee hearing or
debate").
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D. The Structure of CongressionalRules
Even stronger evidence of the degree to which members of the
House and Senate delegate power to their committees, and thus a justification for honoring that delegation in seeking to establish the meaning of statutory language, lies in the details of the rules of the two
chambers. Taken together, they establish beyond doubt that Congress
has made a conscious decision, in carrying out its constitutional function to determine the rules of its own proceedings, to establish an authoritative role for the committee.22 6
1. House Rules
In innumerable ways, the rules of the House of Representatives
strengthen the position of its standing committees and give parliamentary advantages to the products of committee work. Taken together,
they establish a delegation by the members of the House of policymaking power to their chosen committees. Far from the lawless picture painted by the radical textualists, who would ignore the committee report and consider only the bare floor vote on the bill's text, the
picture emerging here is one of clear delegation of authority to committees.
Since the landmark Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,
House rules have set out with some specificity the number of its committees and their respective substantive jurisdiction. Textualists
should consider that at the beginning of each Congress, each chamber
elects the chairs and members of its committees, though in practice
they are selected by the respective party caucuses. 2 7 Rule XII requires that all legislation be referred to a standing committee 2 28 and
the discharge procedure of Rule XV makes it extremely difficult to
dislodge a bill from a committee to which it was referred.22 9 In pracThe best general sources for understanding congressional rules are CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY, GUIDE TO CONGRESS (5th ed., 2000) [hereinafter CQ GUIDE]; OLESZEK, supra note
192; and TIEFER, supra note 197. For a cogent description of the legal status of these rules, see
generally Stanley Bach, The Nature of CongressionalRules, 5 J.L. & POL 725 (1989).
See CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS, H.R. Doc. No.
106-320, at 477,483 (2000) [hereinafter RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES] (Rule X,
cl. 5 (a)(1), members) (Rule X, cl. 5 (c)(1), chairs). See also OLESZEK, supra note 192, at 17-18,
29-33, 103-08; SMrrH & DEERING, supra note 190, at 169-76.
228 See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 227,
at 572-78 (Rule XII,

cl.
2).
M Id. at 637-42 (Rule XV, cl. 2). To discharge a bill from committee is generally
an arduous and delicate procedure. First, a bill must remain in committee for thirty legislative days
before a motion to discharge can be brought. Id. Second, the motion to discharge itself requires
the signatures of two hundred and eighteen members of the House. Id. Finally, significant
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tice, such discharge is rarely accomplished. The rules specifically
delegate to standing committees the duty to "determine whether laws
and programs addressing subjects within the jurisdiction of a committee are being implemented and carried out in accordance with the intent of Congress and whether they should be continued, curtailed, or
eliminated. 2 3 0 They are also empowered to review "conditions or
circumstances that may indicate the necessity or desirability of enacting new or additional legislation addressing subjects within its jurisdiction (whether or not a bill or resolution has been introduced with
respect thereto).",2 3 1 Each committee is required to adopt written rules
and to make them available to the public, 23 2 and to keep a complete
record of its meetings,233 hearings, and votes.734 The use of proxy
voting is prohibited, 35 and a majority of committee
members must be
Z
present in order to report a bill to the floor. 6
In order to prevent a committee chair from bottling up a bill voted
on favorably by the committee, the rules require the chair to report
each such bill promptly and take steps to bring it to a floor vote.237
The Clerk then places reported bills on the appropriate House calendar
for possible floor action. Showing the preference given to favorable
committee action, the rules also provide that bills reported unfavorably
are automatically laid on the table.2 38
The written report of the committee on a bill, the focus of debate
between radical textualists and others, is required to be prepared by
the House rules. 239 The rules outline specific kinds of information that
must be included to guide consideration of the reported bill, including
a comparison with existing law. 240 Rules require the inclusion of dis-

political maneuvering and political costs of bringing such a motion are inevitable and thus further prohibit the procedure from being employed often. See, e.g., LOOMIS, supra note 192, at 5051 (describing the discharge process of an actual bill, and its success, as highly unusual);
OLESZEK, supra note 192, at 152-53 (noting that "[fjrom 1931 through 1994 ... more than five
hundred discharge petitions were filed, but only forty-six attracted the required signatures and
only nineteen bills actually were discharged and passed by the House"). See generally SMrH,
supra note 192, at 170-71; SMrFH & DEERING, supra note 190, at 10-11.
230 RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra
note 227, at 461-64 (Rule X, cl. 2).
231 Id.
232 Id. at 522-45 (Rule XI, cl. 2).
233 Id. at 518-22 (Rule XI,
cl. 1).

Id. at 389-93 (Rule VII, cl. 1).

235 Id. at 530 (Rule XI, cl.
2(f)).
236

Id. at 535-36 (Rule XI, cl. 2(h)(1)).

237

Id. at 590 (Rule XII, cl. 2(b)(1)).
Id. at 588-89 (Rule XIII, cl. 2(a)(2)).

238

239 Id. at 588-602 (Rule XIII,
cl. 2, 3).
240 Id. at 592-602 (Rule XIII,
cl. 3).
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senting or separate views by members of the committee in the printed
report. 241 Showing the importance placed on the content of reports for
floor debate, House rules require that the printed report ordinarily be
available to members for three days before floor action. 242 Committees are also encouraged to have hearings printed and available for
floor debate, but that is rarely possible.243
In addition to this clear structure of delegation to committees,
various other parliamentary rules and traditions of the House give the
upper hand to committee bills and amendments. These include the
tradition of the committee or subcommittee chair managing the bill on
the floor, and the practice of giving committee amendments first priority in the amending process. 244 More general rules like the requirement that all amendments be germane also strengthen the hand of the
committee that drafted the legislation, and the limitation on thirddegree amendments has a similar function of making additions to the
committee bill difficult. 245 This is especially true in the Committee of
the Whole, a parliamentary device used by the House to shape legislation on the floor, because in the Committee of the Whole, amendments
are taken up section by section, thus favoring the committee bill and
its structure.24 6 More subtle traditions, like that of the chair recognizing the bill manager first during floor consideration, add to the committee's preferred position.
Central to the operation of the House, however, is its Rules Committee, a body not found in the Senate. The Rules Committee functions as an arm of the House leadership, and exercises strong control
over the floor agenda.247 The Rules Committee considers each reported bill and proposes a "rule" setting out the parameters of its floor
consideration-whether it may be amended, which amendments will
be in order, and how long debate will last. This special rule must be
adopted separately before consideration of the bill itself. In practice,
the Rules Committee leadership, the majority party leadership, and the
Chairs of the Standing Committees work together to control debate,
241

Id.

242

Id. at 602-05 (Rule XIII, cl. 4).
Id.
See OLESZEK, supra note 192, at 168-69, 175-78 ("House precedents grant priority to

243
244

amendments recommended by the reporting committeefs]."); SMITH, supra note 192, at 171-72,
241-42.
245 See OLESZEK, supra note 192, at 172-83 (noting that the House rules generally require
amendments to be germane); TIEFER, supra note 197, at 767-874.
See OLESZEK, supranote 192, at 172-83; SMrrH & DEERING, supra note
190, at 181-89.
247 See OLEsZEK, supra note 192, at 134, 150, 172-83, 213-14;
SMrrH & DEERING, supra
note 190, at 74-95, 181-89; 1 CQ GUiE, supranote 226, at 25-37.
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limit outside amendments, and maximize the chances of the bill's passage in largely the form reported by the standing committee. The effect is to strengthen the overall role of the committee system and privilege its legislative product during floor debate.
2. Senate Rules
Senate rules are fewer and change less often than House rules,
which must be adopted anew every two years. Being a smaller body
with a tradition of unlimited debate and individualism, the Senate relies more on unwritten rules and comity among its members. For example, the Senate rules do not require that bills be referred to committee, though nearly all are. Senate rules do specify the jurisdictions of
its committees, and contain many of the same procedural requirements
as found in the House rules.2"8
While the Senate has no Rules Committee, its practice of devising
"unanimous consent agreements" performs many of the same functions. 249 Once again, the agreements are arrived at in consultation
between the senate leadership and the committee leadership, with the
significant caveat that they can be blocked by a single senator. Once
agreed to, unanimous consent agreements limit debate and amendments much the same as do resolutions coming from the House Rules
Committee.
Many of the same parliamentary traditions, such as recognizing
committee chairs and committee amendments first, privilege committees in the Senate as in the House. The difference is that in the Senate
there is more of a tradition of open debate and floor consideration of
outside amendments. Much of this stems from the lack of a germaneness requirement for amendments in the Senate. While not as strong
as in the House, the overall effect of the Senate's rules and traditions
also strongly favors the products of its standing committees.
3. Conference Committees
The rules and traditions governing conferences between the House
and Senate to iron out differences in similar legislation for final passage illustrate all the more clearly the extent to which the Congress
reposes trust and confidence in its committees and their printed reports. This is indicated in two different ways-first, by rules delegat248

See SENATE MANUAL,

S. Doc. No. 106-1, at 24-49 (2000) [hereinafter SENATE
MANUAL] (Rules XXV and XXVI).
249 See OLESZEK, supra note 192, at 210-18, 261-67; SMITH & DEERING, supra note 190, at
189-91; and TIEFER, supra note 197, at 767-874.
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ing great power to the "managers" from each house in the conference
committee, and second, by practices strengthening the role of the
standing committees in conference.
On important bills, it is usually clear that one house will not simply accept the other's version of the text, though that is the easiest way
to arrive at a single bill for final presentment to the President. Each
house votes on whether to go to conference after final passage of its
version of a bill. House rules require that in selecting conferees, the
Speaker must select members favorable to the legislation, including
specific provisions in disagreement with the Senate.250 In the Senate,
they are appointed by unanimous consent, usually by agreement between the Majority Leader and the chair of the standing committee
involved2 1 The House and Senate as a whole may, and sometimes
do, instruct their conferees, making it more difficult for them to compromise on certain provisions.2 52 In conference, the managers from
each house vote separately, so that a majority of the conferees from
each side must vote for the final compromise package. They are not
given authority to add other matter to the bill, but must theoretically
stay within the scope of disagreement between the House and Senate
versions. In practice, this restriction is sometimes hard to follow, and
an entirely new matter sometimes creeps in. The conference committee is required by rule to prepare a written statement explaining the
report:
Each such report [the compromise bill text] shall be accompanied by a joint explanatory statement prepared jointly
by the managers on the part of the House and the managers on
the part of the Senate. The joint explanatory statement shall
be sufficiently detailed and explicit to inform the House of the
effects of 3the report [the bill] on the matters committed to conference.k2

250

See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 227, at 342-44 (Rule
I, cl.

21

See SENATE MANUAL, supra note 248, at 23-24 (Rule XXIV).

11).

See also CLEAVES'

MANUAL OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE IN REGARD TO CONFERENCES AND CONFERENCE REPORTS,

in SENATE MANUAL, supra note 248, at 191-206 (containing conference rules as adopted by the
57th Congress in 1900); OLESZEK, supra note 192, at 278-84 (discussing several factors important in determining the selection of conferees); SMrrH & DEERING, supra note 190, at 191-96
("The appointment of conferees is the responsibility of... the presiding officer in the Senate, but
[he] generally follows[s] the recommendation of the appropriate committee chair and ranking
minority member.").
252 See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
supra note 227, at 836-60 (Rule XXII);
SENATE MANUAL, supra note 248, at 50-51 (Rule XXVII, cl. 2).
253 RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 227, at 844-45 (Rule XXII, ci.
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Emphasizing the degree of delegation to the conference committee, rules of the House and Senate specify that the report may be taken
up immediately,
and must be accepted or rejected without amend4
ment?2
A good case can be made, as discussed above, that the problems
of lack of legitimacy raised against reports of standing committees by
Justice Scalia and others lack force when applied to a conference
committee. First and foremost, it represents both of the houses of
Congress. The more direct relationship between the membership of
each house and its managers strongly indicates that the resulting joint
written statement of managers deserves to be considered authoritative
on questions of meaning. In addition, however, the traditions of conference between the houses strongly show the degree to which the
majority reposes trust and confidence in its standing committees.
In practice, managers on each side are dominated by the committee and subcommittee leaders that fashioned the bill and brought it to
final passage. Given the findings of Hall and others noted above, this
should not be surprising-committee leaders are those most knowledgeable about the bill's provisions and most responsible for it. Indeed, some political scientists have argued that the prevalence of
committee leaders on conference committees is the ultimate source of
their power, since they have the theoretical ability to reverse voting
setbacks suffered earlier in the enactment process. 5 The specific rule
requiring conferees to be those primarily responsible for the legislation serves to strengthen the position of the standing committees involved. So do such procedural devices as the requirement of an up or
down vote on the floor and the rules against adding extraneous provisions.

7(e)); SENATE MANUAL, supra note 248, at 51 (Rule XXVIII, cl. 4). The explanatory statement
is prepared jointly by members and staffs from both houses so that there will be a single explanation of particular statutory language and of actions accepting or rejecting particular provisions
from the House and Senate bills.
254

See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 227,
at 841 (Rule XXII, cl.

7(a)); SENATE MANUAL, supra note 248, at 50 (Rule XXVIII, cl. 1).
255 Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The
Institutional Foundations

of Committee

Power, 81 AM. POLY. SCL REV. 85, 85-90, 97-100 (1987). But see Keith Krehbiel, Why are

Congressional Committees Powerful?, 81 AM. POL'Y. Sci. REv. 929, 929-35 (1987) (arguing
that other Congressional institutions constrain committee power).
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E. Committee Reports and the Executive Branch
1. The GeneralAuthoritativeness of Committee Report Language
We have seen in some detail that the history, culture, and specific
procedural rules of the House and Senate support the assertion that
Congress uses its committees and the written reports of its committee
process as an authoritative source of information and background on
the meaning of its laws. Additional support for this proposition can be
gained by understanding the use of committee report language by the
executive branch. By long tradition, pre-enactment report language
specifying the meaning of statutory text or the details of appropriated
budget amounts -is treated as authoritative by the executive departments and administrative agencies. As expressed simply by Congressional Quarterly's defimitive Guide to Congress, "It has been common
practice for committees, including House-Senate conference committees, to write in their reports instructions directing government agencies on interpretation and enforcement of the law., 256 Instructions can
take many forms, from explicit orders to take certain actions pursuant
to an accompanying statute, to guidance in interpreting statutory
terms. In fact, in order to take seriously the constitutional principle
expressed by the Bowsher court and emphasized by Professor Manning-that Congress is confined to passing laws and may not participate in administering them-one must completely ignore the actual
relationship between congressional committees and executive branch
actors. Any serious student of the relationship knows that congressional committees and individual members of Congress often participate in administration of statutory programs, both formally and informally.257 Congress's undoubted power to oversee the operations of
the executive branch and to investigate its programs to determine
I CQ GUIDE, supranote 226, at 485.
Z7 Jessica Korn tells the story of how the Reagan White House, emboldened by Chadha
into thinking that even informal actions by committees could be resisted on constitutional
grounds, instructed all federal agencies that henceforth they should not follow directives in
committee report language. Congressional reaction was quick and effective, threatening both
specific bill provisions to restrict agencies and generally tighter oversight. The administration
backed down, simply reiterating that such directives were not actually legally binding. See
JESSiCA KORN, THE POWER OF SEPARATION 36-37 (1996). In City of Alexandria v. United
States, 737 F.2d 1022 (Fed. Cir. 1984), the Federal Circuit considered this question in upholding
congressional "report and wait" provisions, a close kin to the legislative veto. Observing that our
tradition requires executive branch officials to consider and follow the informal dictates of congressional committees, the court concluded that "[c]ommittees do not need even the type of
'report and wait' provision we have here to develop enormous influence over executive branch
doings. There is nothing unconstitutional about this: indeed, our separation of powers makes
such informal cooperation much more necessary than it would be in a pure system of parliamentary government." Id.at 1026.
2
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whether statutory changes may be necessary makes any such strict
separation of functions unrealistic.2 8 On the level of specific statutory
language, both because ambiguity in such language is inevitable and
because the conditions under which statutes are carried out always
change, this symbiotic relationship cannot be avoided.259
Consider then the striking disjunction created by the radical textualist view of legislative history. Justice Scalia and others would argue
that committee report language should be ignored by judges even if it
supplies clarification for ambiguous statutory language, while at the
same time the entire executive branch treats most such statutory language as authoritative in the day-to-day administration of the same
statute.26 ° Indeed, agencies make special efforts to catalogue and track
all such statutory language. They do so not because committee report
language is "law" in the same sense as the statute is law, 261 but rather
258 See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187
(1957) ("The power of Congress
to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. . . . It encompasses inquiries
concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes...
. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption,
inefficiency or waste.").
259 A particularly interesting recent example is the complex
interaction between Congress
and the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") concerning the interpretation and implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The Act presents a number of difficult
problems of statutory interpretation, and the FCC has made extensive use of the legislative
history of the legislation in implementing it. In one case, Congress actually enacted a later
statutory provision requiring the FCC to prepare a Report to Congress on the FCC's interpretation of certain key statutory terms. The Commission held an open administrative proceeding, in
which members of Congress participated, and submitted its interpretations to Congress. The
FCC took the position that clear Committee language was generally dispositive, along with
drafting history, in explicating ambiguous provisions. For the full story of this unique interpretive process, see John C. Roberts, The Sources of Statutory Meaning: An Archaeological Case
Study of the 1996 TelecommunicationsAct, 53 SMU L. REV. 143 (2000).
Strict adherence to the radical textualist position that use of committee language in interpreting ambiguous provisions is impermissible under Article I would logically lead a court to
reject otherwise reasonable agency interpretations of statutes under their jurisdiction if those
interpretations relied on committee report language (which they almost always do). I have not
seen the textualist argument carried this far, and such an extension would further demonstrate the
illogic of the basic position.
260 Agencies and courts often ignore freestanding report language,
as they should under the
theory advocated in this Article. See, e.g., Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S.
158, 168 (1989) (Conference Committee language discussing meaning of earlier enacted language in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act irrelevant when statute accompanying it
didn't amend the relevant language). The FCC, in trying to decipher the meaning of a provision
of the 1996 Telecommunications Act regarding the use of Local Marketing Agreements
("LMAs") in inferring an ownership interest, relied heavily on the committee report language
accompanying the provision itself. But the Commission explicitly ignored later, freestanding
report language written in connection with the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, because the Act did
not contain any statutory language regarding LMAs. See Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, 14 F.C.C.R. 12903, 12963 (1999) (citing Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 n.13 (1980)).
261 Both the Congress itself and the Comptroller General have recognized that committee
report directives are not legally binding. The Comptroller General has said:
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because committee direction is part of the complicated system of
communication between Congress and the agencies, involving authorization of new programs, appropriation of funds, and general oversight of agency operations. This stark contrast should be taken into
account by those who advocate the radical textualist view, but has
never been specifically addressed by them.
2. The Special Case of the Budget andAppropriationsProcess
The authoritative treatment of committee report language by executive branch agencies is at its apogee in the budget and appropriations process of Congress. In the early years of the nation, Congress
typically appropriated funds in specific amounts for each government
program, and if changes occurred during the fiscal year, supplemental
appropriations laws were passed to alter the amounts to be spent for
each program. As Professor Kate Stith explains in her excellent analysis of the budget process, this cumbersome system eventually gave
way to a more flexible one:
The massive restructuring and growth of the federal government under Franklin Roosevelt finally forced Congress to
refrain from routine, detailed line itemization in appropriation

acts. Instead, Congress resorted to lump-sum appropriations,

Where

is a clear distinction between the imposition of statutory restrictions or
conditions which are intended to be legally binding and the technique of specifying
restrictions or conditions in a nonstatutory context.

... [W]hen Congress merely appropriates lump-sum amounts without statutorily restricting what can be done with those funds, a clear inference arises that it
does not intend to impose legally binding restrictions, and indicia in committee reports and other legislative history as to how the funds should or are expected to be
spent do not establish any legal requirements on Federal agencies.

... [T]his does not mean agencies are free to ignore clearly expressed legislative history applicable to the use of appropriated funds. They ignore such expressions of intent at the peril of strained relations with the Congress. The Executive
Branch ... has a practical duty to abide by such expressions. This duty, however,
must be understood to fall short of a statutory requirement giving rise to a legal infraction where there is a failure to carry out that duty.
LTV Aerospace Corp., 55 Comp. Gen. 307,318-19, 324-25 (1975).
See American Hospital Assn. v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 616 (1991) ("Petitioner does not
-and obviously could not--contend that this statement in the Committee Reports has the force
of law, for the Constitution is quite explicit about the procedure that Congress must follow in
legislating.").
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which consolidated the appropriations for various activities of
each federal agency or department

...

[A]ppropriations acts fund each broadly defined fed-

eral program or activity in one lump sum, termed a budget
"account.26 2
Both authorization and appropriations bills are accompanied by
detailed committee reports giving the specific amounts the department
or agency should spend on each program within the budget account,
except in those cases when Congress intends for the agency to have
the freedom to determine specific programs under a "lump-sum" arrangement. Needless to say, departments and agencies treat these
committee reports as the equivalent of legislation for purposes of their
own budget planning. They would be foolish, except in extreme cases
where the language is flatly inconsistent with the statute, to defy the
committees on which they depend for appropriations by ignoring these
instructions. In fact, this complicated process of supplementing the
simple terms of the statute goes even farther. Congressional committees and their executive branch counterparts have developed over the
years a highly refined process of "reprogramming" review, in which
agencies report to the relevant appropriations subcommittees proposed
changes to the amounts specified to be spent in the printed committee
reports, and receive permission to make the changes.263 This reprogramming process, in many cases reduced to a formal set of written
procedures by the two branches, allows agencies much-needed flexibility to respond to real-world changes and to avoid waste, and at the
same time preserves the constitutional spending power of Congress.
For our purposes, of course, it illuminates an arena in which Congress
itself speaks authoritatively to the executive branch through committees and committee report language, though without the force of
law.2 4
262

Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution:The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings,
76

CAL. L. REv. 595, 611 (1988) (citation omitted).

See also LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL

SPENDING POWER 61-66 (1975); ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY,
PROCESS 14-18, 187-93 (2000).
263 See FISHER, supra note 262, at 75-98; ROBERT
KEITH & ALLEN SCHICK, MANUAL ON
THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 135, 144-45 (Cong. Res. Service, 1998); SCHICK, supra note

262, at 193-229; and Stith,
supra note 262, at 613.
264 See Stith, supra note 262, at 614 ("Such spending detail [in a committee
report] may be
'politically' binding, since an agency will find it advantageous to 'keep faith' with Congress, but

the agency may in its discretion depart from them."); see also sources cited supra note 261.
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Congressional efforts to regularize and control spending in the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974265 and
in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985, 26 popularly known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings ("GRI"),
raised this long-standing practice of authoritative communication
through committee reports to new heights. The automatic sequestration procedure, which is the critical enforcement mechanism of
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, must be carried out across the board, with
each budget account reduced by the same percentage. As Professor
Stith explains the process:
Accordingly, whether GRH's uniformity requirement applies to a particular item of expenditure is decided by future
legislatures in appropriations acts or future appropriations
committees in their reports.... To make an item of expenditure a "program" for purposes of GRH, it is enough simply to
identify the item as such in either an appropriations act or a
committee report

... Under GRH, committee reports can be expected to assume greater prominence, for they effectively prescribe how
sequestration shall take place.267

This critical role of committee report language is actually written
into the law.2 8 Apparently, because of doubts concerning the constitutionality of such a procedure, Congress used the device of a joint
resolution (equivalent to regular legislation) to incorporate detailed
program designations made by the appropriations committees for the
first year of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings' operation, 269 but it has not
repeated that formal incorporation mechanism. The Reagan administration took the position that while budget account designations that
accompanied the original appropriations acts were constitutionally
permissible, delegating authority to committees to change budget ac265

Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 1,

2 & 36 U.S.C.).
266 Pub. L. No. 99-177,99 Stat. 1037 (1985) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
2,
31 &42 U.S.C.).
Stith, supra note 262, at 646.
See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 252 (a) (1) (B) (i), 99 Stat. 1037, 1072 (1985) (referring
to laws "and accompanying committee reports").
20 See Stith, supra note 262, at 648.
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counts in the future, and thus control sequestration, ran afoul of
Chadha.270 The analysis put forth in this Article would support the
same conclusion under some circumstances. Because of Congress's
power to control its own rules under Article I, Section 5, Appropriations Committee report language that explained in more detail the
large sum included in a particular budget account appearing in a later
statute would be perfectly proper. Later, free-standing report language
purporting to change the contours of budget accounts, outside of subsequent appropriationslegislation, would not be entitled to the same
constitutional respect. Interestingly, Congress resorted to the same
sort of device in the Line-Item Veto legislation,27 1 attempting to give
legal standing to certain items of legislative history in subsequent bills
that defined specific programs eligible for the President's cancellation. 272 Again, I would argue that such use of committee reports
should not be treated as authoritative unless it is a germane part of
some later enactment process.
A full examination of the role of congressional committees in controlling the executive branch and in managing federal expenditures is
outside the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, this brief examination
supports the general point being made in this section, that Congress
has created a system in which the language of committee reports is
used as a vehicle to convey important information about subsequently
passed statutes-providing background principles, purposes, detailed
explanation of the meaning of statutory text, and other vital material of
use to both the executive and judicial branches. Radical textualists
have advanced no good reason why the authoritativeness of report
language should be different for courts and agencies.
F. Summary
What does this review of the history, culture, and rules of the
House and Senate ultimately teach us about the authoritativeness of
committee reports? It establishes that Congress has in fact delegated
broad power to its committees to consider the need for legislation,
formulate and explain the legislation, and manage its passage. It
shows that Congress has used its power under the Rulemaking Clause
See id. at 647-5 1.
Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996) (codified as amended
in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
272 See Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget
Process and
the Line Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REv. 871, 880-81 (1999) ("LIVA [the Line Item Veto
Act] allows the President to cancel programs that are listed separately in any table, chart, or text
in the relevant managers' statement or committee report, or any amounts that other legislation
requires be allocated to particular projects.").
270
271
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of the Constitution to fashion a committee system in which it reposes
confidence and on which it relies to accomplish the complex business
of legislating. A thorough understanding of the rules and traditions
surrounding the committee, and particularly the conference committee, make it extremely difficult to accept the arguments of Justice
Scalia and Professor Manning that the content of committee reports
should be ignored as unreliable and illegitimate. As we have seen,
Congress uses its committee reports, and especially conference committee reports, to provide context and explanation for otherwise afnbiguous statutory text. In the eyes of members, both the text and the
written products of its committees provide necessary information
about the meaning of a statute. This is even truer in the context of the
budget and appropriations process, in which report language actually
supplements and amplifies lump sum numbers in the enacted bill. In
short, if a majority of the Congress relies so heavily on the committee
system as the best way to conduct its legislative business, and if the
executive branch also treats the language in committee reports as authoritative, how can a court justify ignoring and denigrating written
committee reports, which are the formal products of that system?
VII. A RADICAL TEXTUALIST RESPONSE
Before leaving the subject of the constitutional position of congressional committee reports, we might do well to ask how a committed radical textualist might respond to these arguments. As to my
analysis of Article I, Chadha and Bowsher, Justice Scalia and his colleagues would undoubtedly take issue with my specific interpretations
of the cases and their underlying constitutional principles. Fair
enough; these are debatable matters.
As to the new argument I make based on the Rulemaking Clause,
however, my guess is that the response would be somewhat different. 273 So what? Justice Scalia might say. You have proven that Congress has the constitutional power to do just about anything within its
own four walls, but haven't made a case for extending the influence of
the Rulemaking Clause to anyone or anything outside the legislative
273

Justice Scalia might argue that these limitations on use of legislative history are actually

limits on judicial behavior, implicit in Article III, and thus sidestep my analysis altogether. But
this argument, which Bill Eskridge perceptively suggested to me, completely alters the basis of
the radical textualists' critique. Chadha and Bowsher would be irrelevant. As I have pointed out,
Justice Scalia and his followers are not clear on the question of who violates the Constitution
when committee reports are referred to, and when the violation occurs. However, the fairest
interpretation of their writings is that the committee itself violates Article I at the time the report
is created and not the judge at the time of interpretation. The radical textualists are thus likely to
stick with their Article I critique.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:489

branch. You particularly haven't shown why the Rulemaking Clause,
a purely procedural provision directed at Congress, has any effect on a
judge interpreting a statute. Congress can create all the committees it
desires, so long as it does not purport to give them the power to enact
statutory text or participate in statutory interpretation.
There are several responses to this point, and discussing them
briefly might help to clarify this Article's most important contentions.
First, one might observe that the presentment and bicameralism principles Justice Scalia relies on to exclude consideration of legislative
history are also procedural, and are also addressed solely to the legislative branch in the text of the Constitution. How is it that those constitutional principles can be used to control the contours of acceptable
interpretive practice, but the Rulemaking Clause cannot? Perhaps it is
because they are more essential to the structure of the Constitution, but
a persuasive answer is not immediately apparent.
Second, I would contend that the federal case law discussed in
Part VI.C. shows that courts have given the Rulemaking Clause a
breadth that does in a sense extend to matters outside of the strictly
internal concerns of the Congress. The venerable enrolled bill rule
itself, which Justice Scalia staunchly defends, insulates even the most
egregious misbehavior during the enactment process from challenge,
regardless of the effect it might have on the other branches or individuals. So long as a bill is properly enrolled, its procedural validity
may not be questioned. Mester 74 shows that the Rulemaking Clause
can even trump the Presentment Clause. Nixon 275 demonstrates that it
must be respected even when the rights of a non-legislator are at stake.
Michel276 is a case in which the Rulemaking Clause was arguably used
to modify other specific provisions in the Constitution about the
makeup of the legislative branch. Likewise, in Vander Jagt,277 the
clause insulates actions that arguably have a profound impact on the
rights of voters, whose representatives' committee votes were diluted.
In short, it is simply too facile to insist that the power of Congress to
make its own rules derives from a purely procedural constitutional
provision, and therefore may not have any effect on the interpretive
function of a judge. It has historically had a much more powerful impact; until now, however, the Rulemaking Clause has not been considered as a part of the legislative history debate.

274

Mester Mfg. Co. v. INS, 879 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1989). See supra Part VI.C.

275

Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). See supraPart
VI.C.

276 Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1884). See
supraPart VI.C.
277

Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See supra Part VI.C.
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Third, I would point to the materials in Part VJI.E. on the use of
committee reports by agencies and in the budget process to emphasize
that committee reports made pursuant to the Rulemaking Clause do, in
the real world of government, have profound and tangible consequences. Granted, the persuasive effect of committee report language
in that context is not "binding" in the legal sense, but then neither is
the authoritative use I argue for in statutory interpretation. Again; it
would be anomalous for Justice Scalia to accept the reality of congressional influence on agencies and on the President through committee
language, as courts have uniformly done, and to deny it in the case of

statutory interpretation.
If the reader rejects these answers, finally, I would take issue with
the premise of this hypothetical response, i.e., that I am necessarily
arguing that the Rulemaking Clause can have an effect on functions or
entities outside of the legislative branch. A better view may be that I
am simply arguing for the proper place of the Rulemaking Clause and
its products within the legislative branch, not nearly so radical a
proposition.
Consider the context in which these disputes arise. A court is
faced with a statutory provision that is ambiguous, or perhaps with
two provisions that seem to conflict. The judge needs to give a meanig to the statutory words in question because she must resolve the
legal dispute between the parties. The question addressed in this Article is whether she can legitimately look to written reports of standing
committees or conference committees to assist her in giving meaning
to the text. Justice Scalia seems to say that doing so violates Article I
of the Constitution. But the focus of legal analysis in such a case is
on the content and product of the enactment process. I contend that
the Rulemaking Clause lends support to the idea that it is appropriate
to look at the entire enactment process-to the written products of the
relevant committees as well as the text of the statute-in determining
the meaning of ambiguous words. In doing so, I need not argue that
the Rulemaking Clause somehow controls or has a legal effect on
functions outside the legislative branch. The court is attempting to
arrive at meaning by examining what happened inside the legislative
branch during the enactment process, and the argument is over what
materials may be excluded and for what reason.
Despite Justice Scalia's rhetoric, after all, at the moment of statutory interpretation there is no committee chair or group of members
pressing any particular meaning on the judge. The committee report is
entirely passive at this point-an item of research to be found and
evaluated. It is therefore fanciful to accuse the Congress of violating

570
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the Constitution at the moment of interpretation-the members who
wrote both the text of the statute and the committee report may be
long departed. And it is also fanciful to conclude that giving effect to
the Rulemaking Clause, by respectfully considering the entire process
by which Congress arrived at the text, is somehow giving external
effect to an essentially internal and procedural command in Article I,
Section 5. Considering the Rulemaking Clause only serves to buttress
the appropriateness of the practice perceptive and conscientious judges
have long engaged in-considering all of the evidence bearing on
statutory meaning before making a decision.
CONCLUSION

The radical textualist assault on legislative history materials ultimately founders on the rocks of reality and common sense. Most
questions of statutory interpretation are resolved by a careful reading
of the text, an examination of its structure, and an analysis of related
statutes, just as Justice Scalia says. The vast bulk of these interpretive
questions do not reach the appellate courts. Most judges and scholars
agree that legislative history should take a secondary position to enacted text in this interpretive process. But faced with a statutory provision which may be susceptible of two meanings, judges will continue to refer to committee reports for guidance as to which was intended by the legislature. Most judges will be quite understandably
incapable of ignoring reference materials that may help decide the
case before them. Perhaps recognizing this powerful commonsense
pull toward the use of committee materials as authoritative aids to
interpretation, Justice Scalia and Professor Manning have attempted to
move the argument to another plane, by arguing that such use is illegitimate as a matter of constitutional law. This Article attempts to
respond to their effort to exclude committee reports from the interpretive arsenal, first by contending that Article I concerns do not preclude
such authoritative use, and second by establishing that pre-enactment
committee reports rest on an independent constitutional base-the
Rulemaking Clause of Article I, Section 5. The core argument of the
radical textualists, then-that statutory text has constitutional legitimacy and committee reports do not-is simply untenable. Properly
understood, the Constitution provides a solid basis for consideration of
committee reports as a primary contextual aid in resolving statutory
ambiguities.
Re-establishing the Article I legitimacy of committee reports,
however, does not end the debate over their proper use in interpreting
statutes. Scholars and judges still must grapple with difficult ques-
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tions, even though they are not constitutional questions. Exactly when
is it appropriate to turn to legislative history, keeping in mind that
clear statutory text must always be given priority? How much weight
is to be given to the various items of legislative history? How can a
judge detect and avoid the pitfalls created by the occasional abuse of
legislative history by legislators and their staffs? Answering these
questions involves respect for Congress's prerogatives under the
Rulemaking Clause, but it also requires a sophisticated understanding
of the enactment process. That understanding is too often lacking in
judicial opinions that attempt to resolve difficult questions of statutory
interpretation. Ultimately, answering these kinds of questions about
the proper use of legislative history will ensure that both the courts
and the legislature are allowed to play the full roles assigned to them
in our constitutional system.

